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Application of the Federal Mail and Wire 
Fraud Statutes to Criminal Liability For 
Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping 
WILLIAM K.S. WANG*1 
SEC Rule 10b-5 covers a great deal of stock market insider 
trading and tipping, but certainly not all. For insider trading 
defendants, some elements of criminal liability may be dif-
ferent and possibly easier to satisfy under mail/wire fraud 
than under SEC Rule 10b-5 (e.g., materiality, and the re-
quirements for tipper and tippee liability recently tightened 
for Rule 10b-5 by the Second Circuit). Generally, courts 
have not addressed these possible differences. 
With insider trading and tipping, the victim of mail/wire 
fraud could be either the information-owner or the party on 
the other side of the transaction. The courts have not exam-
ined the latter victim and the possibility that such mail/wire 
fraud liability might be broader than under the Rule 10b-5 
“classical relationship.” Another unexplored question is 
whether an employee of a company engaging in an insider 
trade of its stock could be criminally liable under two differ-
ent mail/wire fraud theories with two separate mail/wire 
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 1 This Article draws upon WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, 
INSIDER TRADING (Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 2010). 
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fraud victims: the company/information-owner and the party 
on the other side of the transaction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses the application of the federal mail fraud2 
and wire fraud3 statutes to criminal liability for stock market insider 
trading and tipping, and whether, for this conduct, mail/wire fraud 
might be broader than SEC Rule 10b-5.4 For example, for mail/wire 
fraud, materiality may have a standard that is (1) laxer (beyond “rea-
sonable person”) or, (2) in cases involving deprivation of informa-
tional property, different (importance to the owner of the infor-
mation as opposed to a stock market investor).5 
In addition, for mail/wire fraud, as opposed to Rule 10b-5 fraud, 
tipper and tippee liability may be more extensive.6 Recently, under 
Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit made it more difficult for the prose-
cution to demonstrate the “personal benefit” requisite for the initial 
                                                                                                             
 2 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). The essence of the statute has been in effect since 
1872. See Peter J. Henning, Maybe it Should Just be Called Federal Fraud: The 
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 441 (1995) 
(“The essential structure of the statute has remained consistent since its enactment 
in 1872.”). 
For a discussion of the origins of the mail fraud statute, see id. at 441–50; ELLEN 
S. PODGOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 4.1(A), at 71–73 (West 2013) (de-
scribing its origins in recodifications in 1872, 1889, and 1909); C.J. Williams, 
What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287, 287–96 
(2014); Brette M. Tannenbaum, Note, Reframing the Right: Using Theories of 
Intangible Property to Target Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 359, 364–69 (2012). For an extensive discussion of the history and early 
interpretation of the statute, see Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute 
(Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980). For criticism of the breadth of the mail fraud 
statute, see Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An Argument for 
Repeal by Implication, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 983 (1997). 
 3 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). For a discussion of the application of Rule 
10b-5 to stock market insider trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, chs. 
4, 5. 
The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 pursuant to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 5 For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part II(B)(4). 
 6 For a discussion of whether the Rule 10b-5 “personal benefit” test for the 
initial tipper and the “know or should have known” test for the tippee applies to 
mail/wire fraud, see infra Part II(B)(5). 
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tipper7 and to demonstrate the requirement that the tippee “knows or 
should know” of the initial tipper’s violation.8  
With insider trading and tipping, the victim of mail/wire fraud 
could be either the information-owner or the party on the other side 
of the transaction. Courts have not explored the latter victim and the 
possibility that such mail/wire fraud liability might be broader than 
under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship.”9 Nor have the courts 
considered whether an employee engaging in an insider trade of her 
company’s shares could be criminally liable under two different 
mail/wire fraud theories with two separate mail/wire fraud victims: 
the company/information-owner and the party on the other side of 
the transaction.10 
                                                                                                             
 7 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451–53 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., Oct. 5, 2015). For additional discussion of this 
portion of Newman, see infra notes 218–28 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 453–55. For additional discussion of this portion 
of Newman, see infra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. In Newman, the gov-
ernment did not charge the defendants with mail/wire fraud. See 773 F.3d at 442–
43. 
 9 For discussion of this question, see infra Part II(B)(2). 
 10 For discussion of this issue, see infra Part II(B)(3). 
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II.  SOME ELEMENTS OF MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY 
The mail and wire fraud provisions prohibit the “use” of the 
mails (or “private interstate carrier”)11 or the “use” of “wire com-
munication”12 to further a “scheme to defraud.”13 One treatise notes: 
                                                                                                             
 11 The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or 
to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, 
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit 
or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or any-
thing represented to be or intimated or held out to be such coun-
terfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post of-
fice or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or 
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or 
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever 
to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate 
carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, 
or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier ac-
cording to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is 
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, 
any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs 
in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, 
transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, 
a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those 
terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Dis-
aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), 
or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not 
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or 
both. 
In 1994, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1341 to extend its coverage to anyone 
who “deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent 
or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier.” Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–332, § 250006, 108 Stat. 
1796, 2087. See Brandon Weston, Note, Annual Survey of White Collar Crime: 
Mail and Wire Fraud, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1425 n.12, 1433 n.68 (2014). 
Thus, when discussing the mail fraud statute, this Article will use “mail” to in-
clude the use of both the United States Postal Service and a private or commercial 
interstate carrier. 
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For a discussion of the meaning of “private or commercial interstate carrier,” see 
Henning, supra note 1, at 469–76. Professor Henning concludes that “the Gov-
ernment must prove that the business of the company . . . involves significant 
interstate shipments, and not just that the general business has an effect on inter-
state commerce.” Id. at 474. For additional discussion, see 2 KATHLEEN F. 
BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 8:56.10 (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 
2014); Williams, supra note 2, at 302–03. United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 100 
(2d Cir. 2002), concluded “[A]pplication of the mail fraud statute to intrastate 
mailings sent or delivered by private or commercial interstate carriers [in this case, 
Federal Express], is a permissible exercise of Congress’s power [under the Com-
merce Clause] . . . .”. Accord United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
For a discussion of jurisdiction and venue under the mail/wire fraud statutes, see 
Jack E. Robinson, The Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Correct Standards 
for Determining Jurisdiction and Venue, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 479 (2008). 
 12 The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, provides: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, 
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, 
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, 
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose 
of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the viola-
tion occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, 
transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in con-
nection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emer-
gency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person 
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 years, or both. 
Section 902 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended 18 U.S.C. chapter 63, 
containing the mail and wire fraud provisions, to provide: “Any person who at-
tempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to 
the same penalties as those prescribed for the offence, the commission of which 
was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012). For dis-
cussion of this amending provision, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, 
§ 7.2.1, 617 n.24; Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the 
Mind Like the Prospect of a Hanging: The Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 125, 144–47 (2004) (noting that under the new provision 
(1) the prosecution need neither allege nor prove an overt act and (2) prosecutors 
are not required to use 18 U.S.C. § 1349 as opposed to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (the gen-
eral conspiracy statute) and, therefore, in plea bargaining, can offer the defendant 
either the 20-year charge of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 or the 5-year charge of 18 U.S.C. 
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“One finds wire fraud charges premised on telephone calls, micro-
waves, fax transmissions, and electronic transmissions. Because of 
the high use of computers, wire fraud is a common charge in a white 
collar case involving a transmission via the internet.”14 
The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are two different laws, 
but are interpreted similarly. Where the two statutes share the same 
language, the law developed under the mail fraud statute applies to 
wire fraud and vice versa.15 Allegations of securities law violations 
                                                                                                             
§ 371); Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty 
Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535, 1553–55 
(2002) (concluding that the provision is not exceedingly important, except that, 
where § 902 applies, plea-bargaining prosecutors will not be able to offer the 
lesser maximum five-year sentence for general conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 
because § 902 would replace 18 U.S.C. § 371). 
 13 For a discussion of the “use” of the “mail” or “wire” and “scheme to de-
fraud,” see infra Part II(A). For a discussion of the penalties for mail/wire fraud, 
see 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG, LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, & MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, 
BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD, § 6:372 (2d ed. 2015); 2 
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:62–63; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 11.1. 
For a discussion of the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to mail 
fraud, see 1 JOEL ANDROPHY, WHITE COLLAR CRIME, § 8:15 (2d ed. 2014); 
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41930, MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 7–9 (2011) [hereinafter 
OVERVIEW]; Charles Doyle, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal 
Criminal Law, in MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: ELEMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN 
FEDERAL CRIMES 6–7 (Eric J. Cass & Andreas N. Schuster eds., 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Doyle Chapter]; Weston, supra note 11, at 1446–47. For an empirical study of 
average sentencing for mail/wire fraud, see Lucian E. Dervan, White Collar Over-
criminalization: Deterrence, Plea Bargaining, and the Loss of Innocence, 101 
KY. L. J. 723 (2012–13). For a discussion of the application of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines to insider trading generally, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 7.2.2. 
 14 ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL, supra note 2, § 4.9(A), at 92. See also Rose v. 
United States, 227 F.2d 448, 449 (10th Cir. 1955) (stating wire fraud statute’s 
language is “broad enough to include an interstate telephonic communication”). 
For a discussion of when use of the internet involves the required “interstate” 
communication, see infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005) (“we have 
construed identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia.”); 
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire fraud 
statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the 
same analysis to both sets of [insider trading/tipping] offenses here.”); United 
States v. Green, 594 F.3d 1057, 1063 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Shipsey, 363 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004)); United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 
532 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Shipsey, 363 F.3d at 971 n.10 (“It is well settled 
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and mail and/or wire fraud violations are often joined in a single 
indictment.16 
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, lower 
courts have uniformly held that a private right of action does not 
exist under the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes.17 
                                                                                                             
that cases construing the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are applicable to ei-
ther.”); United States v. Mills, 199 F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Carpen-
ter); United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995); 2 BRICKEY, 
supra note 11, §§ 8:39, 8:60; CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME § 2:3 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDE]; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 2; 2 SARAH 
N. WELLING, SARA SUN BEALE, & PAMELA H. BUCY, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND 
RICO § 17.2 (1998 & Supp. 2000); Williams, supra note 2, at 304–05; Weston, 
supra note 11, at 1425. 
 16 For examples of insider trading cases resulting from such indictments, see 
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19; United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 649 (5th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 
12, 14 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983) (un-
published order); United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 726 F. Supp. 1424, 1427, 
1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425, 425–26 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989). See generally United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 
1991); see id. at 19 (explaining indictment with both securities fraud and mail 
fraud counts is not multiplicitous); United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 
(7th Cir. 1980) (holding the simultaneous prosecution under mail fraud statute and 
another statute does not violate double jeopardy clause because the offenses in-
volve different elements). But cf. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1398 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (noting, in non-insider trading case, that it was unnecessary for the 
prosecutor to include mail fraud counts because the possible prison sentence un-
der the Securities Exchange Act for the defendant’s activity was as much as any 
judge would impose, and all the mail fraud count would accomplish was the col-
lection of additional fines). 
 17 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 501 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (“Prior to RICO, no federal statute had expressly provided a 
private damages remedy based upon a violation of the mail or wire fraud stat-
utes . . . .Moreover, the Courts of Appeals consistently had held that no implied 
federal private causes of action accrue to victims of these federal violations.”); 
Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d 402, 407–08 (8th Cir. 
1999) (mail fraud and wire fraud); Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 
1178–79 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding no private right of action under mail fraud stat-
ute); Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding no pri-
vate right of action under mail fraud statute) (citing Napper v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 
634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding no private right of action under wire fraud stat-
ute)). Cf. Oppenheim v. Sterling, 368 F.2d 516, 518–19 (10th Cir. 1966) (finding 
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The Supreme Court has identified the two important elements of 
mail fraud as “(1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to 
defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the 
mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the 
scheme (or specified fraudulent acts).”18 A circuit court opinion pro-
                                                                                                             
no federal question jurisdiction in civil case based on violation of mail fraud stat-
ute). 
Nevertheless, mail and wire fraud violations constitute “racketeering activity” un-
der the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2012). The RICO statute creates an express private cause of 
action for up to three times damages plus legal costs. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) 
(2012). In 1995, however, Congress eliminated “conduct that would have been 
actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities” as a predicate offense for 
civil RICO, except after a criminal conviction in connection with the fraud. See 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, § 107 (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964(c)). 
An interesting question is whether, even without a criminal conviction, a private 
civil RICO claim may be available if insider trading or tipping constitutes 
mail/wire fraud, but does not violate securities fraud statutes. For discussion of 
the ambiguity of the phrase “conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in 
the purchase or sale of securities,” see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. 
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 12.1 (1st ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002). 
 18 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989); accord Pereira v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (“(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing 
of a letter, etc., for the purpose of executing the scheme.”). Accordingly, most 
cases state that the government need prove only these two elements. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bailey, 
123 F.3d 1381, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997); Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 
331, 336 (4th Cir. 1996). 
Some courts phrase the test for liability in terms of three elements. For example, 
one circuit court gave the following summary of the elements of mail fraud:”(1) 
the defendant participated in some scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) the defendant 
or someone associated with the scheme used the mails or ‘caused’ the mails to be 
used, and (3) the use of the mails was for the purpose of executing the scheme.” 
Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481–82 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1985)). See 
also United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 857 (6th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 
1292 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Toney, 605 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1979). 
The two-prong and three-prong tests are effectively the same. 
For still other similar formulations of the elements for mail fraud, see United 
States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 191 
F.3d 326, 334 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Lack, 129 F.3d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 
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vided a similar summary and continued: “Each mailing in further-
ance of the scheme constitutes a separate violation. Intent to deceive 
and knowing use of the mails are the scienter elements of mail 
fraud.”19 Other courts also have stated that mail/wire fraud viola-
tions require specific intent to defraud.20 
                                                                                                             
1997); United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Moser, 123 F.3d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1997). 
For a general discussion of the elements of mail and wire fraud, see ANDROPHY, 
supra note 13, §§ 8:2–8:7; Doyle Chapter, supra note 13, at 3–6; OVERVIEW, su-
pra note 13, at 2–7; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, §§ 8:32–8:58; PODGOR ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 71–94; 7 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION, § 22.4 (6th ed. 2009 & 2015 Supp.); WELLING, BEALE, 
& BUCY, supra note 15, §§ 17.4–17.25; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, 
§ 11.2; see generally Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Redefining the Boundaries, 10 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 557 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Boundaries]; Weston, supra 
note 11, at 1426–44. For a selected bibliography on mail fraud, see Boundaries, 
supra, at 573–77. 
 19 United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986). Citing 
Vaughn, United States v. Garlick, 240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) held: “[E]ach 
use of the wires under the wire fraud statute constitutes a separate offense.” Ac-
cord Weston, supra note 11, at 1427 (“Each use of the mails or wires constitutes 
a separate offense and therefore can be a separate count in an indictment.”); 2 
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:56; 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, 
§17.32(B). But cf. Williams, supra note 2 (arguing that each mailing should not 
be separate offense and that Congress should amend the statute to clarify that 
“scheme to defraud” should be a unit of prosecution, not each individual mailing). 
 20 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (discussed 
below); United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rajwani, 476 
F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2007) (requiring “conscious knowing intent to defraud”) 
(citing United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 736 (5th Cir. 2001)); United States 
v. Novak, 443 F.3d 150, 156–59 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing evidence sufficient 
for showing of intent); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 887 (10th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Bouyea, 152 F.3d 
192, 194 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991) (“‘conscious knowing 
intent to defraud’” required). 
For a lengthy discussion of the “fraudulent intent” requirement in wire and mail 
fraud, see Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 184–87 (2d Cir. 1995). For 
other discussions of the intent requirement, see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:51; 
2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, §§ 17.20–17.25; Doyle Chapter, su-
pra note 13, at 5; Weston, supra note 11, at 1429–32. 
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In the leading insider trading mail/wire fraud case, Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), 
the Supreme Court noted: “[T]he District Court’s conclusion that each of the pe-
titioners acted with the required specific intent to defraud is strongly supported 
by the evidence.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). The principal defendant, Winans, 
was one of two authors of a column in the Wall Street Journal; Winans conspired 
with other defendants to profit through trading stocks based on the column’s prob-
able impact. See id. at 22–23. The Court found that Winans had a specific intent 
to defraud his employer, the Wall Street Journal. See id. at 28. The employee 
manual declared that the “Journal’s business information that it intended to be 
kept confidential was its property . . . .” Id. Winans demonstrated his awareness 
of the policy when he twice told his editors of leaks by other employees. See id. 
For related discussion of the discussion of intent in the circuit court and trial court 
opinions below, see infra notes 244, 250 and accompanying text. 
The court in United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236–39 (3d Cir. 2005), held 
that the defendant must knowingly participate in a fraudulent scheme: “Unwitting 
participation in a fraudulent scheme is not criminal under § 1341. Moreover, the 
relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant acted knowingly in making any mis-
statement, but whether she did so with respect to the overarching fraudulent 
scheme . . . .” Id. at 237 (citing United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d 
Cir. 1978)). 
The court in United States v. Akpan stated that the “defendant acts with the intent 
to defraud when he ‘acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the 
purpose of causing pecuniary ‘loss to another or bringing about some financial 
gain to himself.’’” 407 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 732 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
In United States v. Given, the court noted with approval that the trial court had 
used the circuit’s pattern instruction: “When the word ‘knowingly’ is used in these 
instructions, it means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware 
of the nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or acci-
dent.” 164 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting the Seventh Circuit’s instruc-
tion). 
The jury may infer intent from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. 
Daniel, 749 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 
723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rogers, 321 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Owens, 301 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Britton, 289 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Maxwell, 
579 F.3d 1282, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A jury may infer an intent to defraud from 
the defendant’s conduct.”); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:51, at 133 (“Direct 
proof of fraudulent intent is not required.”); Weston, supra note 11, at 1430. 
For a discussion of whether the defendant must intend to injure the alleged victim 
of the fraud, see Welch, 327 F.3d at 1104–06; United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 
19, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing intent required by defendant); United States 
v. Rossomando, 144 F.3d 197, 199–201 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing jury instruction 
on defendant’s required intent); Boundaries, supra note 18, at 566–68; Elkan 
Abramowitz, ‘Intent to Harm’ in Federal Statute on Mail Fraud, N.Y.L.J., May 
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5, 1998, at 3 (discussing how the prosecution need only show defendant’s intent 
to harm victims). 
Some opinions have equated “reckless indifference” or “willful blindness” to spe-
cific intent to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440–41 
(1st Cir. 2005) (approving “willful blindness” jury instructions); United States v. 
Titchell, 261 F.3d 348, 351 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 
1117, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), superseded on other grounds by statute, U.S 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015), 
as recognized in United States v. Hymas, 780 F.3d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 2015) 
and United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 125–26 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Tram-
mell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The ‘schemer’s indifference to the 
truth of statements can amount to [evidence of] fraudulent intent.’”) (quoting 
United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1507 (10th Cir. 1994)); United States v. 
Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Proof of specific intent is required . . . 
which ‘may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless 
disregard for the truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1994)); United States v. Duncan, 29 F.3d 448, 450 & n.1 (8th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1507 (10th Cir. 1994). See also 
United States v. Carlo, 507 F.2d 799, 802 (2d Cir. 2007) (approving charge that 
defendant “had actual knowledge that his statements were false or, in the alterna-
tive, that he was aware of a high probability that they were false, but consciously 
avoided confirming that suspicion”); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:48, at nn. 
584–88 and accompanying text (actual knowledge of falsity and deliberate avoid-
ance of the truth may be treated the same); id. § 8:51, nn.639, 654.25, 654.30 
(citations of opinions endorsing “willful blindness” or “reckless indifference”); 
OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 5; OTTO G. OMERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 9:03 (2013); 2 
WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.8; Weston, supra note 11, at 1431 
(“intent requirement can be satisfied by proof of a reckless disregard or indiffer-
ence for the truth of one’s representations”). Cf. United States v. Ferguson, 676 
F.3d 260, 267, 277–79 (2d Cir. 2011) (in case involving conspiracy, mail fraud, 
securities fraud, and false statement made to the SEC, allowing a “conscious 
avoidance” jury instruction under the circumstances of the case). See generally 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2066, 2070–72 (2011) (dis-
cussing “willful blindness” in a civil patent infringement trust case); Samuel W. 
Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 567 (2011); Michael Clay 
Smith, Recklessness and Good Faith Under the Mail Fraud Statute: Mens Rea by 
Accident?, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 315 (1991); J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing 
Insider Trading: United Sates v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1419 (2015) (discussing Global Tech and “willful blindness” in criminal 
cases generally and in Rule 10b-5 insider trading cases). 
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement and its application to insider 
trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.4. For discussion 
of the special features of the Rule 10b-5 scienter of tippers and tippees, see id. 
§ 4.4.5. 
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Further, courts have found violations where the fraudulent 
scheme did not succeed. In other words, a failed attempt is still a 
“scheme to defraud” under the mail and wire fraud statutes.21 
                                                                                                             
 21 See United States v. Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 585 (1st Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“actual or in-
tended . . . harm to the victim need not be established”); United States v. Yeager, 
331 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999, 
1006 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 698–99 (7th Cir. 
1991) (finding defendant still violates the mail and wire fraud statutes even if de-
fendant attempts to trade on confidential information but in fact traded on public 
information, i.e., defendant “was unlucky or a bad judge of the value of the infor-
mation”); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated by 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); ANDROPHY, supra note 13, 
§ 8:3; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:58; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 4; Weston, 
supra note 11, at 1428 (“the government need not show that the scheme was suc-
cessful”); id. at 1437 (“success of the scheme is not required”). See also Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (“The common-law requirements of ‘jus-
tifiable reliance’ and ‘damages,’ for example, plainly have no place in the federal 
fraud statutes [including mail and wire fraud] . . . .[T]he elements of reliance and 
damage would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.”). 
As mentioned earlier, section 902 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amended 18 
U.S.C. chapter 63 (containing the mail and wire fraud provisions) to provide: 
“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter 
shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offence, the com-
mission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1349 
(emphasis added). For additional discussion of this provision, see supra note 12. 
Under Rule 10b-5, a failed attempt is also illegal. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 5.2.8[F], at nn.467–78. 
Section 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal penalties for: 
“[w]hoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice . . . 
[to commit fraud in connection with a publicly traded security].” 18 U.S.C. § 1348 
(2012) (emphasis added). For a discussion of this provision, see RALPH C. 
FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY, & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER 
TRADING AND THE WALL §§ 1.02[2], 2.03[2] (2014); WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, §§ 7.2.1, at n.17, nn.25–26, and accompanying text. 
For the upholding of a jury conviction under § 1348, see United States v. Mahaffy, 
693 F.3d 113, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2012). For discussion of both Section 807 and 
Mahaffy, see David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement 
in White Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1435–37 (2008). 
For the upholding of a “conscious avoidance” jury instruction under both mail 
fraud and § 1348, see United States v. Stinn, 379 F. App’x 19, 20–21 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
The Supreme Court has expressly reserved deciding whether a tippee may violate 
Rule 10b-5 if she erroneously thinks she has material nonpublic information and 
trades upon it. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 
312 n.21 (1985). Nevertheless, several lower courts have stated that such a tippee 
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Mail/wire fraud is an inchoate crime that applies to someone 
who devises a scheme to defraud, causes a requisite use of the mail 
or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme, and does nothing 
more to implement the scheme. Indeed, the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes broadly apply to someone who “having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . “22 In the words of the 
Supreme Court, “[t]he elements of the offense of mail fraud . . . are 
(1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc., for the 
purpose of executing the scheme.”23 
                                                                                                             
may be liable for attempting to violate Rule 10b-5. See Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 
412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) (discussing a tippee who traded on information 
that he thought was material and nonpublic but turned out to be fictitious: “[W]e 
are not convinced of any difference in substance between a successful fraud and 
an attempt. The statutory phrase ‘any manipulative or deceptive device,’ . . . seems 
broad enough to encompass conduct irrespective of its outcome.”); Grumet v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 340 (D.N.J. 1983); Summerlin v. 
Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., [1982–1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 99,197, at 95,793 n.6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 1983). See also Tarasi v. Pitts-
burgh Nat’l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1161 (3d Cir. 1977), overshadowed by Bate-
man, 472 U.S. 299 (“There is no dispute regarding the nature of the securities law 
violations committed by the plaintiffs [who incorrectly believed they were trading 
on inside information].”); Schick v. Steiger, 583 F. Supp. 841, 847, 847 n.32 (E.D. 
Mich. 1984); Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 50, 54–55, 
55 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (quoting Kuehnart with approval, and finding plaintiff cannot recover dam-
ages if she has unclean hands). 
 22 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (emphasis added). For the language of the stat-
utes, see supra notes 11, 12. 
In contrast, Exchange Act § 10(b) forbids the “use or employ[ment of] . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Inter 
alia, Rule 10b-5 prohibits the “employ[ment of] any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud . . . .” and “engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 23 Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954). Accord Schmuck v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989) (quoted supra at text accompanying note 17). 
See United States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The crime of wire 
fraud does not require that the defendant’s object be attained. It only requires that 
the defendant devise a scheme to defraud and then transmit a wire communication 
for the purposes of executing the scheme. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.”); 2 Brickey, 
supra note 11, § 8:58, at n.724 (citing Pereira). 
For discussion of the requisite use of the mail or wires, see infra Part II(A). 
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II. APPLICATION OF MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD TO CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY FOR STOCK MARKET INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING 
A. Use of the Mails or Wires “In Furtherance” of the 
Fraudulent Scheme of Stock Market Insider Trading or 
Tipping 
A defendant can be convicted under the mail fraud or wire fraud 
statutes even if she (or her associate) has not personally used the 
mails or wires. The defendant, or her associate,24 need only know-
ingly “cause” something to be delivered by mail (or “private inter-
state carrier”),25 or “cause” a use of the wires.26 The Supreme Court 
has interpreted such “causing” to include the performance of “an act 
with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary 
course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, 
                                                                                                             
 24 See United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 1990) (“‘so long 
as one participant in a fraudulent scheme causes a use of the mails in execution of 
the fraud, all other knowing participants in the scheme are legally liable for that 
use of the mails’”) (quoting United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355 (5th Cir. 
1979)); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1151 (7th Cir. 1974) (convicting 
co-schemers “[o]f the mailing of a letter which one of [their] partners caused to 
be mailed in the execution of the scheme.”). 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, see supra note 11). See 
Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3; Joseph E. Edwards, An-
notation, What Constitutes “Causing” Mail to be Delivered for Purpose of Exe-
cuting Scheme Prohibited by Mail Fraud Statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341), 9 A.L.R. 
Fed. 893, § 4 (1971). 
The mailing can be established by circumstantial evidence. See United States v. 
Joshua, 648 F.3d 547, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 
845, 854 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating prosecution must still bear the burden of demon-
strating to the jury the use of the mails beyond a reasonable doubt); United States 
v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 571 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 
865, 874 (6th Cir. 1994). 
For an example of a case finding that the government had not proven, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that a letter was actually mailed rather than, say, hand delivered, 
see United States v. Spirk, 503 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2007). 
For discussion of the 1994 amendment to the mail fraud statute to extend coverage 
to “any private or commercial interstate carrier,” see supra note 11. 
 26 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (for the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, see supra note 12). 
For typical types of “wire” communication, see supra text accompanying note 14. 
2015] MAIL, WIRE FRAUD STATUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING 235 
even though not actually intended . . . .”27 The actual mailing can be 
by an innocent party who is not part of the scheme.28 
The use of the mails or wires must also be “in furtherance” of 
the fraudulent scheme.29 Nevertheless, the mailing need not be an 
essential element of the scheme, but rather need only be “incident to 
an essential part of the scheme”30 or some step in the scheme.31 Rou-
tine mailings that are innocent in themselves can satisfy the mailing 
                                                                                                             
 27 Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8–9. See United States v. Green, 964 F.2d 365, 369 
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1195 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Edwards, supra note 25, §§ 2[a], 4, 7, 9. Cf. Rakoff, supra note 2, at 775–76 (not-
ing a foreseeable use of mails required to compensate for the absence of statutory 
language requiring intent to use mails). For related discussion, see infra note 53 
and accompanying text. 
 28 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 711–15 (1989) (mailing by 
innocent victims); Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8–9 (mailing by innocent bank that mailed 
check cashed by defendant); United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 441–43 
(1917) (mailing by innocent insurance company); United States v. Cooper, 596 
F.2d 327, 329–30 (8th Cir. 1979) (mailing by non-defendant bank); United States 
v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 1979) (mailing by defendant’s insurance 
agent who was not part of the scheme). 
In the insider trading case, Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the conviction of a former columnist for the Wall Street Journal and his 
co-defendants based on the innocent company’s use of the mails and wires to dis-
tribute the newspaper. See 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987). The columnist and his tippees 
profited by trading stocks in advance of the column’s publication. See id. at 23. 
For additional discussion of Carpenter’s analysis of the requisite use of the mails 
and the wires, see infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. For discussion of 
Carpenter’s analysis of the requisite “scheme to defraud,” see infra Part II(B)(1). 
 29 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710 (statute only reaches frauds “in which the 
use of the mails is a part of the execution of the fraud”) (quoting Kann v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 88, 95 (1944)); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399–401 
(1974), superseded in bank fraud cases by bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 
(2012); United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 76–81 (1962); Parr v. United 
States, 363 U.S. 370, 389–91 (1960); Kann, 323 U.S. at 93–95. 
The defendant need not personally cause the mailing or the use of the wires. See 
United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 493 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 
v. Turner, 557 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2008)); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:54. 
 30 Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710–11; Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8. 
 31 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710–11; Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 
394 (1916); OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3. 
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requirement, provided that the routine mailings advance the fraudu-
lent scheme32 and would not be mailed but for the scheme.33 In any 
                                                                                                             
 32 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 711, 714–15; OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3; 2 
WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.28(A); Weston, supra note 11, at 
1436. 
Routine mailings that are designed to “lull the victims into a false sense of secu-
rity” advance the fraudulent scheme. See Maze, 414 U.S. at 403 (distinguishing 
Sampson, 371 U.S. at 79–81); United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 582 
(6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stein, 37 F.3d 1407, 1409 (9th Cir. 1994). For 
additional discussion of “lulling,” see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:53, at nn.663, 
669, 671.25, 688–91 and accompanying text. For a discussion of how to treat post-
transaction “lulling” mailings, see infra note 34. 
Nevertheless, even routine mailings that do not lull the victims may still satisfy 
the mailing requirement. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715 (even “mailings that some-
day may contribute to the uncovering of a fraudulent scheme . . . [can] supply the 
mailing element of the mail fraud offense”); OVERVIEW, supra note 13, at 3. For 
additional discussion of Schmuck, see infra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
For a holding that a mailing of bank statements did not aid nor further the fraud-
ulent scheme, even though the bank account itself was an essential part of the 
scheme, see United States v. Hartsel, 199 F.3d 812, 814, 816–18 (6th Cir. 1999). 
For a holding that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
particular wire transfer was part of a particular fraudulent scheme, see United 
States v. Jedynak, 45 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817–21 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding where 
non-fraudulently obtained funds in account were sufficient to cover wire transfer, 
government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that fraudulently obtained 
funds were in the wire transfer). 
 33 See United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1984); Weston, 
supra note 11, at 1436. In Parr v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a 
local school district’s mailings of tax statements and receipts were not in further-
ance of a scheme to misappropriate and embezzle the school district’s funds and 
property. See 363 U.S. 370, 385–92 (1960). The reason was that the school district 
was compelled by law to collect and assess the taxes. See id. For a discussion of 
Parr, see United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Most . . . 
circuits to address the issue have interpreted Parr to hold that ‘mailings of docu-
ments which are required by law to be mailed, and which are not themselves false 
and fraudulent, cannot be regarded as mailed for the purpose of executing a fraud-
ulent scheme.’”) (quoting United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 
1982)). 
In Mitchell, the defendant’s mailings were also required by law to be sent, but the 
Ninth Circuit distinguished Parr: “The tax statements, checks, and receipts mailed 
in Parr . . . would have been mailed even if the scheme to defraud . . . had not 
existed. In Mitchell’s case, the fraudulent scheme triggered the mailings, which 
would not have occurred except as a step in the scheme.” Mitchell, 744 F.2d at 
704. 
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event, the mailing apparently must occur before the “termination” 
of the fraudulent scheme.34   
Nevertheless, the definition of the scheme can be quite broad.35 
For example, Schmuck v. United States36 involved a defendant who 
bought used cars, rolled back their odometers, and then sold the au-
tomobiles to Wisconsin retail dealers at inflated prices.37 The duped 
retail dealers would ultimately resell the cars to members of the pub-
lic.38 To transfer title, the retailers would mail a title application 
form to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.39 The Su-
preme Court held that “a rational jury could have found that the title-
registration mailings were part of the execution of the fraudulent 
                                                                                                             
 34 A number of Supreme Court decisions have held that a mailing was insuf-
ficiently connected to the fraudulent scheme because it took place after the 
scheme had reached “fruition.” See Maze, 414 U.S. at 399–05; Parr, 363 U.S. at 
370; Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 93–95 (1944). But see United States v. 
Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 741 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding post-fraud communication 
to be mail or wire fraud if intended to “‘lull the victims into a false sense of secu-
rity, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the 
apprehension of the defendants less likely.’”) (quoting Maze, 414 U.S. at 403); 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1244–45 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United 
States v. Otto, 742 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1984)) (“Even mailings made after the 
fruits of the scheme have been received may come within the statute when they 
are ‘designed to lull the victims into a false sense of security . . . .’”). 
The court in United States v. Biesiadecki interpreted Schmuck v. United States, 
489 U.S. 705, 711 (1989), as follows: “[T]he Supreme Court held that . . . forms 
which were mailed after the fruition of the scheme to defraud, even though only 
tangentially related to the scheme, were sufficient to satisfy the mailing ele-
ment . . . .”). 933 F.2d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 1991). For additional discussion of “lull-
ing,” see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.28(D). 
In any event, courts disagree on whether a post-fraudulent-transaction “lulling” 
mailing extends the duration of the scheme. For a thorough discussion of this 
question and description of other circuit views, see both the majority and concur-
ring opinions in United States v. Tanke, 743 F.3d 1296 (9th Cir. 2014). The Tanke 
majority criticized some other circuits for effectively allowing a post-scheme 
mailing to satisfy the mailing requirement. See id. at 1303–04. The Tanke majority 
rejected these other circuit holdings as contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See 
id. For additional discussion of this issue, see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:53, 
at nn.671.35, 673 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 710–15 (discussed immediately below); 2 
WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, §§ 17.28(B), 17.28(D). 
 36 489 U.S. 705 (1989). 
 37 See id. at 707. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. 
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scheme, a scheme which did not reach fruition until the retail dealers 
resold the cars and effected transfers of title.”40 Additionally, “a fail-
ure of this passage of title would have jeopardized Schmuck’s rela-
tionship of trust and goodwill with the retail dealers upon whose 
unwitting cooperation his scheme depended.”41 A mailing meets the 
statutory requirement even if it “someday may contribute to the un-
covering of a fraudulent scheme . . . and return to haunt the perpe-
trator of the fraud.”42 
A stock market insider trader can usually foresee that the mails 
or wires will be used at some stage of the transaction, including or-
der placement, execution, and confirmation.43 A fraudulent insider 
trading scheme does not terminate until at least the closing,44 when 
the defendant receives the securities bought or the proceeds of the 
                                                                                                             
 40 Id. at 712. 
 41 Id. at 714. 
 42 Id. at 715. 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Schmuck could not be distinguished from 
the Court’s more restrictive earlier opinions of Kann, Parr, and Maze. See id. at 
722–25 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 723-24 (“For though the Government chose 
to charge a defrauding of retail customers (to whom the innocent dealers resold 
the cars), it is obvious that, regardless of who the ultimate victim of the fraud may 
have been, the fraud was complete with respect to each car when petitioner pock-
eted the dealer’s money . . . .[W]e have held that the indispensability of . . . me-
chanical mailings, not strictly in furtherance of the fraud, is not enough to invoke 
the statute.”). 
For discussion of Schmuck, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, 
§ 17.28; Henning, supra note 2, at 457–60; Ross Cockburn, The Mail Fraud Stat-
ute: Expanding Its Scope, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 809, 815–17 (1990). For a general 
discussion of the “mailing” requirement, see Henning, supra note 2, at 450–60. 
 43 See Joseph J. Humke, Comment, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider 
Trading Outside the Lines of Section 10(b), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 819, 844 (1997) 
(“And no one can reasonably deny that virtually every modern securities transac-
tion is conducted via the mails and/or wires.”). Cf. Int’l Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 
812 F.2d 149, 154–55 (4th Cir. 1987) (“It will be the unusual fraud that does not 
enlist the mails and wires in its service at least twice.”); Roberts v. Smith Barney, 
Harris Upham & Co., 653 F. Supp. 406, 413 (D. Mass. 1986) (“A single fraudulent 
event will almost always involve multiple acts of wire, mail or securities fraud.”); 
B.J. Skin & Nail Care, Inc. v. Int’l Cosmetic Exch., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 563, 565 
(D. Conn. 1986) (“Nearly all business dealings involve frequent use of telephones 
and mail.”). 
 44 For a discussion of when a scheme might terminate after the closing of a 
transaction, see supra note 34. 
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securities sold.45 The exchange of money,46 securities,47 or both, or-
dinarily involves the use of the mails or wires.48 Furthermore, after 
                                                                                                             
 45 At closing, the defendant actually receives the benefit of the fraudulent 
scheme. See United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[S]cheme to 
defraud is not complete until the proceeds have been received”). Thus, a mailing 
at the closing of an insider trade differs from the mailings in Kann, Parr, and 
Maze, which “involved little more than post-fraud accounting among the potential 
victims of the various schemes . . . .” Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 714. 
 46 For examples of mail fraud cases holding that the mailing or transportation 
of a check was part of a fraudulent scheme, see Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 
1, 8 (1954) (“[T]he mailing of the check by the bank, incident to an essential part 
of the scheme, is established.”); United States v. Lennartz, 948 F.2d 363, 370 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (mailing of salary checks was part of a fraudulent scheme); United 
States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 1463, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendant’s 
receipt of mailed cancelled checks can be “incident to an essential part of the 
scheme”); United States v. Cavale, 688 F.2d 1098, 1112 (7th Cir. 1982) (mailing 
of payment checks was part of a fraudulent scheme violating the mail fraud stat-
ute); Williams v. United States, 278 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1960); Tincher v. 
United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1926); Headley v. United States, 294 F. 
888, 889–90 (5th Cir. 1923). Cf. United States v. Franks, 309 F.3d 977, 977–78 
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the interstate transportation of the checks was essen-
tial to a scheme’s success where defendant embezzled almost 450 checks received 
by her employer and deposited the checks into defendant’s personal bank account, 
and the bank then forwarded the checks for collection using interstate couriers); 
United States v. Alanis, 945 F.2d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 1991) (requisite mailing 
was insurance company’s mailing of check to defendant in settlement of fraudu-
lent life insurance claim); United States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (N.D. 
Miss. 1988) (“Here the government alleges that the mailings of NMSC invoices, 
county checks and other documents all helped the fraudulent scheme to succeed 
by concealing the cash payoffs. The court is inclined to permit the government 
the opportunity to prove its assertions at the trial of this matter.”). For an example 
of a case referring to wire transfers of money as use of the wires, see United States 
v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95 (2d Cir. 2012). But cf. Am. Auto. Acces., Inc. v. Fishman, 
175 F.3d 534, 542–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving plaintiffs in a private civil RICO 
action who were unable to demonstrate that fraudulent checks involved use of 
mail or wires; cashed checks were transported to bank by private armored car 
service). 
 47 For a case holding that the mailing of stock certificates met the mailing 
requirement, see United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291, 1298–99 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 48 The wire communication must be “interstate.” See infra notes 54–55 and 
accompanying text. For discussion of when use of the internet involves an “inter-
state” communication, see infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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the transaction, the stockbrokers on both sides of the trade custom-
arily mail or wire confirmation notifications.49 In several mail fraud 
insider trading cases, the stockbrokers’ mailing of confirmation slips 
constituted the required mailings.50 These various uses of the mails 
                                                                                                             
 49 For examples of opinions stating that the mailing of a securities transaction 
confirmation slip can constitute the requisite mailing, see United States v. Lay, 
612 F.3d 440, 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 
972 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Cohen, 518 F.2d 727, 736–37 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
In United States v. Ashman, the court held that, under the facts of the case, the 
requirement of use of the mails or wires was met by statements sent to customers 
confirming execution of trades of futures contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade. 
See 979 F.2d 469, 481–83 (7th Cir. 1992). 
The court in United States v. Ragan reversed the defendant’s mail and wire fraud 
convictions because no reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of “causing” the fictitious trade tickets to be 
transmitted via wire and then through the mail to customers of a securities firm. 
See 24 F.3d 657, 659–60 (5th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, the court apparently as-
sumed that the mailings of the confirmation slips could constitute the requisite use 
of the mail for application of the mail fraud statute. See id. 
 50 See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 401 F.3d 940, 946 (8th Cir. 2005) (per 
curiam), aff’d en banc, 425 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. O’Hagan, 
139 F.3d 641, 652 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 696–97 
(7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s attempt to parse his scheme into two sepa-
rate schemes: misappropriation of information and subsequent use of information 
to trade stocks; holding that the requisite mailings and wirings were those neces-
sary to execute stock trades based on the misappropriated information); United 
States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Victor 
Teicher & Co., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1151–52 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States v. 
Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. David, No. 86 
Cr. 454 (JFK), 1986 WL 13805, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1986). 
With extensive discussion, the insider trading case of United States v. O’Hagan 
held that the mailing of confirmation slips furthered the defendant’s scheme to 
defraud. See 139 F.3d at 652. The court noted: 
O’Hagan’s scheme to defraud involved not only the unlawful 
purchases of Pillsbury securities, but also the use of the profits 
obtained from the illegal trading to conceal his prior misappro-
priation of client funds. The confirmation slips informed O’Ha-
gan that the Pillsbury securities had been purchased and pro-
vided him a record of his purchases. 
Id. 
Probably, O’Hagan would have held the same way even if the insider trading 
profits were not being used to cover the misappropriation of client funds. The 
opinion notes that the confirmation slips 
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or wires should be sufficiently connected to the insider trading 
scheme to satisfy the statutory requirement.51 
Even if the execution of a stock market insider trade itself some-
how involves no use of the mails or wires, the entire fraudulent 
scheme at some stage is still likely to involve some use of the wires 
by persons involved or not involved in the scheme.52 As with the 
                                                                                                             
helped O’Hagan keep track of his numerous Pillsbury option 
contract purchases made at various prices, in different quanti-
ties, with different strike prices, different expiration dates, and 
from different brokers, particularly given O’Hagan’s testimony 
before the SEC that he called one of his brokers after he re-
ceived a confirmation slip to inquire about that option’s expira-
tion date. 
Id. 
Discussed later is how the Supreme Court found the requisite use of the mail and 
wires in the insider trading case of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 
(1987). See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
The link between the insider trading scheme and the use of the mails can be espe-
cially close if the defendant uses various mechanisms to conceal his trading ac-
tivity: 
In view of the sophisticated mechanisms employed for conceal-
ment of defendant’s activities by use of foreign bank accounts, 
distribution of purchase orders, and utilization of confederates 
abroad, it is plain that the fraudulent scheme contemplated use 
of the mails as an integral feature of its operation and an essen-
tial incident to its successful consummation. 
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. 1981) (Dumbauld, J., concur-
ring), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983) (unpublished order). 
 51 Again, the wire communication must be “interstate.” See infra notes 54–
55 and accompanying text. 
 52 For typical types of “wire” communication, see supra text accompanying 
note 14. See generally James D. Lawlor, Annotation, Federal Criminal Prosecu-
tions Under Wire Fraud Statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1343) for Use of “Blue Box” or 
Similar Device Permitting User to Make Long-Distance Telephone Calls Not Re-
flected on Company’s Billing Records, 34 A.L.R. Fed. 278, § 1 (1977). 
The wire communication element is satisfied even though part of the transmission 
of a telephone call may have been carried by microwave signals. See, e.g., United 
States v. Foley, 683 F.2d 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. King, 590 
F.2d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1978). Nor need the wire transmission be regulated by the 
Federal Communications Commission. See United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 
941, 943 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving private interstate telephone circuits leased from 
AT&T by TWA). 
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element of mailing, the defendant need only have “caused” the use 
of the wires in the sense that she would have been able reasonably 
to foresee that her acts would involve such use.53 
One significant difference exists in the jurisdictional element of 
the mail and wire fraud statutes. Whereas even an intrastate mailing 
suffices for mail fraud,54 a wire transmission must actually pass out-
side the state for wire fraud.55 An interesting question is when the 
                                                                                                             
 53 See United States v. Gill, 909 F.2d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 163, 177 (5th Cir. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 718 
F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (affirming wire fraud convictions); United 
States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Conte, 349 
F.2d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1965). For related discussion, see supra note 27 and ac-
companying text. 
 54 See Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251, 265 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(citing United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2002)); United States v. 
Photogrammetric Data Servs. Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 252 (4th Cir. 2001); Annulli v. 
Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 200 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 
733, 742 (5th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1363–64 (8th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 776 n.7 (8th Cir. 1977) (“It is 
irrelevant that all of the mailings in this case may have been intrastate in na-
ture . . . .”); ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:5; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8.53 
n.696.50 and accompanying text; Williams, supra note 2, at 303. 
Both Gil, 297 F.3d at 99–100, and Photogrammetric Data Servs., 259 F.3d at 
247–52, held that Congress intended that the mail fraud statute apply to both in-
trastate and interstate deliveries of mail matter by private and commercial inter-
state carriers and that such application was a permissible exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause. For related discussion, see supra note 11. 
 55 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See Annulli, 200 F.3d at 200 n.9 (citing Smith v. Ayres, 
845 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1988)); Bacchus Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887, 
892 (10th Cir. 1991); First Pac. Bancorp v. Bro, 847 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Ayres, 845 F.2d at 1366; United States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 
1975); Utz v. Correa, 631 F. Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); ANDROPHY, supra 
note 13, § 8:5; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8.61; Guide, supra note 15, §§ 2:3, 
2:7; 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 29; Williams, supra note 2, at 
305. 
The jurisdictional element is satisfied if “a wire communication whose origin and 
ultimate destination are within a single state [is] . . . routed through another state.” 
Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 373 F.3d at 265 (citing United States v. Davila, 592 F.2d 
1261, 1263 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
The defendant does not have to anticipate that the communication will travel out-
side state boundaries. See United States v. Stern, 858 F.2d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908 (2d Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Blassingame, 427 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The statute does not 
condition guilt upon knowledge that interstate communication is used. The use of 
interstate communication is logically no part of the crime itself. It is included in 
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use of the internet involves an interstate communication under the 
wire fraud statute.56 
                                                                                                             
the statute merely as a ground for federal jurisdiction.”); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 
11, § 8.61 n.753 and accompanying text. But cf. United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 
370, 375 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The government must show that the accused knew or 
could have foreseen that a communication in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme 
was interstate, if the conduct giving rise to the scheme would not be a violation of 
state law and was not itself morally wrongful.”). 
 56 For examples of opinions discussing this issue and upholding convictions 
for wire fraud under the circumstances of the case, see United States v. Kieffer, 
681 F.3d 1143, 1153–55 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Siembida, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 589, 596–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that the email message in question went 
from one New York address to another, but there was a stipulation among the 
parties that an expert would testify that defendant’s email system servers were in 
Pennsylvania and the email message in question would have gone through Penn-
sylvania). 
United States v. Fumo, 2009 WL 1688482, *8 to *9 (E.D. Pa. 2009), held that the 
wire fraud statute does not require proof that e-mails were sent interstate: 
Undisputedly, the e-mails at issue were sent via the Internet. 
Regardless of whether an e-mail is sent and received within the 
same state, “fluctuations in internet traffic” could result in the 
e-mail actually crossing state lines prior to reaching its fi-
nal destination. Because such a determination is impossible, it is 
legally sufficient for purposes of the “interstate commerce” re-
quirement that the e-mails at issue were sent and received 
through the Internet. 
Id. at *9 (footnote committed). Accord DNJ Logistic Grp., Inc. v. DHL Express 
(USA), Inc., No. 08-CV-2789 (DGT), 2010 WL 625364, at *6 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 
19, 2010) (“[R]ecent cases appear to treat any use of the internet as sufficiently 
interstate in nature”). 
Although dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant committed wire fraud 
because of lack of “deceit,” Internet Archive v. Shell, apparently assumed that the 
defendant’s use of the internet constituted the requisite use of the “wires.” See 505 
F. Supp. 2d 755, 768 (D. Co. 2007). 
For additional discussion of this issue, see NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE, 
& SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 200-02 
(5th ed. 2010); PODGOR ET AL, supra note 2, § 4.9(B), at 92; Weston, supra note 
11, at 1427. 
For an opinion affirming the sentence of a defendant who pled guilty to using the 
internet to commit wire fraud, see United States v. Pirello, 255 F.3d 728, 732 (9th 
Cir. 2001). 
Two commentators have concluded: “the geography of the internet makes it likely 
that messages travel across state lines, and perhaps across even national borders, 
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In short, at some stage of an insider trading scheme, a mailing or 
an interstate wire or telephone transmission normally will occur and 
should be sufficiently related to the scheme to satisfy the statutory 
requirement.57 
Carpenter v. United States58 is the major case in which the Su-
preme Court has applied the mail and wire fraud statutes to stock 
market insider trading. When discussing the required use of the 
mails or wires, the decision did not focus on the mechanics of the 
                                                                                                             
even if the origin and destination sites are in the same state.” Morgan Cloud & 
George Shepherd, Law Deans in Jail, 77 MO. L. REV. 931, 946 (2012). 
 57 For discussion of the necessary connection, see supra notes 29–42 and ac-
companying text. For examples of mail fraud insider trading cases in which the 
stockbrokers’ mailing of confirmation slips constituted the required mailings, see 
supra note 49. 
Both United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 939, 943 (4th Cir. 1999), and United 
States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 966–67 (4th Cir. 1995), affirmed a stock market 
insider trading defendant’s wire fraud conviction without discussing the requisite 
use of the wires. Similarly, United States v. Ruggiero, affirmed the wire fraud 
conviction of an insider trading defendant in just two paragraphs and with no dis-
cussion of what constituted the required use of the wires. See 56 F.3d 647, 656 
(5th Cir. 1995). For additional discussion of Ruggiero, see infra notes 166–75, 
249–52 and accompanying text. 
In the insider trading case of United States v. Elliott, the indictment charged the 
defendant with 34 counts of wire fraud “[s]ince the [stock] purchases were made 
by wire.” 711 F. Supp. 425, 426 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Apparently, the defendant did 
not contest this feature of the indictment. For additional discussion of Elliott, see 
infra notes 101–03 and accompanying text, 208–14 and accompanying text. 
The court in United States v. Rajaratnam refused to suppress the government’s 
wiretap evidence against an insider trading defendant. See N. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 
2010 WL 4867402, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). The government had earlier 
obtained judicial authorization of the wiretaps because of probable cause that the 
defendant and others were involved in a scheme that involved, inter alia, wire 
fraud. See id. A related insider trading defendant, Roomy Khan, pled guilty to 
wire fraud. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2012). 
In another insider trading case, United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., the prose-
cution pointed to an interstate telephone call in which one defendant allegedly 
telephoned a co-conspirator and requested that the co-conspirator destroy a page 
from a desk calendar. See 726 F. Supp. 1424, 1434–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court 
dismissed this count of the indictment because the telephone communication was 
not for the purpose of executing the scheme or lulling the victims into a false sense 
of security. See id. at 1435. The telephone call took place after the SEC had begun 
an investigation. See id. Therefore, the call was part of a coverup of a completed 
scheme that had already aroused suspicion. See id. 
 58 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
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defendants’ stock transactions. Instead, the opinion found the mail-
ing/wiring elements satisfied because the defendants relied on the 
distribution of the Wall Street Journal to further their scheme and 
knew that the mails and wires would be used: 
[C]irculation of the . . . column [written by one of the 
defendants] was not only anticipated but an essential 
part of the scheme. Had the column not been made 
available to Journal customers, there would have 
been no effect on stock prices and no likelihood of 
profiting from the information leaked . . . .59 
Later, with little discussion, the Supreme Court insider trading 
case, United States v. O’Hagan,60 in effect affirmed the defendant’s 
mail fraud convictions.61 The opinion did not address the defend-
ant’s requisite use of the mails.62 
B.   Stock Market Insider Trading or Tipping as a Mail/Wire 
“Scheme to Defraud” 
1. THE INFORMATION-OWNER AS VICTIM 
In the insider trading case Carpenter v. United States,63 the Su-
preme Court unanimously upheld the defendants’ convictions for 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. at 28. 
 60 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 61 See id. at 678. For additional discussion of O’Hagan’s mail fraud holding, 
see infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. For discussion of O’Hagan’s Rule 
10b-5 opinion, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 4.6, 5.4 
& nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B]. 
 62 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678. On remand, the Eighth Circuit found that 
the mailing of the confirmation slips for O’Hagan’s purchases constituted the req-
uisite mailings. See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 652 (8th Cir. 1998). 
For discussion of this opinion, see supra note 50. 
 63 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For additional discussion of Carpenter, see infra notes 
237–51 and accompanying text. 
Because the Court in Carpenter split evenly on the federal securities law ques-
tions, it did not issue an opinion on those issues. See 484 U.S. at 24. 
The Supreme Court decided Carpenter after its Rule 10b-5 classical relationship 
insider trading cases of Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), and Dirks 
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), but before the Court’s Rule 10b-5 misappropriation 
(and mail fraud) opinion in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
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violations of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and for con-
spiracy.64 One of the defendants, Winans, was one of two authors of 
the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column.65 Winans 
entered into a scheme with the other defendants to buy and sell 
stocks in advance of the columns’ publication in order to profit from 
the columns’ probable impact on the market.66 
The Court rejected the defendants’ reliance on McNally v. 
United States67 for their contention that they did not obtain “money 
or property” from the Journal, a necessary element of the crime un-
der the mail and wire fraud statutes.68 McNally held that the lan-
guage and legislative history of the mail fraud statute “indicates that 
the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the 
people from schemes to deprive them of their money or property.”69 
Thus, a violation of the statute, although not requiring a monetary 
loss, mandates a showing that the interest involved is a cognizable 
“property right,” whether tangible or intangible. McNally found the 
citizenry’s right to good government too tenuous and ambiguous to 
be encompassed by the statute.70 
                                                                                                             
 64 See 484 U.S. at 21–22, 28. The federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
provides in pertinent part: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United 
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for 
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of 
the conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
For discussion of § 371 and a new conspiracy provision added by section 902 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, see supra note 12; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 7.2.1 at 617 n.24. 
 65 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22. 
 66 See id. at 22–23. 
 67 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 68 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25–26. 
 69 McNally, 483 U.S. at 356. 
 70 See id. at 358–61. But cf. United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131, 1139 
(5th Cir. 1997) (“We begin with the proposition that the concept of property rights 
should be given a broad interpretation for the purposes of the mail fraud statute.”) 
(citing McNally, 483 U.S. at 350; Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 19; United States v. 
Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 
248, 253 (6th Cir. 1988)). See generally Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 
26 (2000) (holding, under the circumstances of the case, mail fraud statute did not 
reach fraud in obtaining license from state; state had no “property” interest in li-
cense granted; not sufficient that the object of the fraud, the license, might become 
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In reaction to McNally, Congress, in 1988, a year after the opin-
ion, amended the United States Code chapter containing both the 
mail and wire fraud statutes to provide expressly that “schemes to 
defraud” include schemes “to deprive another of the intangible right 
of honest services.”71 Nevertheless, in 2010, the Supreme Court held 
in Skilling v. United States72 that the 1988 amendment covers only 
bribery and kickback schemes.73 With this limitation, the amend-
ment would not apply to stock market insider trading or tipping. 
                                                                                                             
“property” in the hands of the licensee; mail fraud statute “requires the object of 
the fraud to be ‘property’ in the victim’s [the grantor/state’s] hands”). 
 71 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (originally enacted as Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4508) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the 
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive an-
other of the intangible right of honest services.”). For discussion of the amend-
ment, see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–11 (2010). 
For discussion and criticism of the “intangible rights” doctrine under mail and 
wire fraud, see John C. Coffee Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal 
and Civil Law Models—and What can be Done About it, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 
1879–80 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Re-
flections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 193, 202–08 (1991); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intan-
gible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 
157 (1994). See generally Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez, Honest Services Fraud as a 
Criminal Breach of Fiduciary Duties: A Comparative Law Approach for Reform, 
18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 100 (2015). 
 72 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
 73 See id. at 402–11. For discussion of Skilling and the “honest services doc-
trine” generally, see ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:9; Charles Doyle, Deprivation 
of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions, in 
MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD: ELEMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMES 
33–67 (Eric J. Cass & Andreas N. Schuster eds. 2012); Albert W. Alschuler, Ter-
rible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling 
v. United States, 67 SMU L. REV. 501, 502–04 (2014); Sara Sun Beale, An Honest 
Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251 (2010); Joan H. Krause, Skilling and 
the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 363 (2012); Pamela Mathy, 
Honest Services Fraud After Skilling, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 645, (2011); Lori A. 
McMillan, Honest Services Update: Directors’ Liability Concerns After Skilling 
and Black, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 149 (2011); Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Crimi-
nalizing the Denial of Honest Services after Skilling, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 27 
(2011); J. Kelly Strader, Skilling Reconsidered: The Legislative-Judicial Dy-
namic, Honest Services Fraud, and the Ill-Conceived “Clean Up Government 
Act,” 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 309 (2011); Tannenbaum, supra note 2. 
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In any event, the acts in Carpenter arose before the 1988 amend-
ment, however interpreted.74 Therefore, the Court in Carpenter dis-
tinguished McNally by unanimously finding that the relevant right 
of the Journal was not the defendant Winans’ obligation of honest 
service, but rather the newspaper’s “interest in the confidentiality of 
the contents and timing of the ‘Heard’ column as a property right.”75 
Such an interest, the Court said, is well established as a property 
right,76 and encompasses “news matter.”77 Even if the defendants 
did not interfere with the Journal’s use of the confidential infor-
mation, the defendants did deprive the newspaper of its right to ex-
clusive use of the information.78 
Carpenter also rejected the defendants’ contention that their ac-
tivities did not constitute fraudulent activity within the meaning of 
the mail and wire fraud statutes.79 The Court relied on its decision 
in McNally for the proposition that the statutes encompass all 
schemes to deprive another of money or property: “[T]he words ‘to 
defraud’ have the ‘common understanding’ of ‘wronging one in his 
property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,’ and ‘usually sig-
nify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane 
                                                                                                             
 74 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 21–23. 
 75 Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 76 See id. at 26 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 
(1984); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983); Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. 
Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–51 (1905); 3 WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.10, 245 
(rev. ed. 1986)). 
In a subsequent insider trading case, the Second Circuit summarized Carpenter as 
follows: “Carpenter actually holds generally that, even though ‘confidential busi-
ness information’ is intangible, it ‘has long been recognized as property.’” United 
States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Carpenter, 484 U.S. 
at 19). Accord United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(citing Grossman, 843 F.2d at 86, in an insider trading case). For discussion of 
Grossman, see infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
For criticism of the Supreme Court’s holding that confidential business infor-
mation is property for the purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes, see John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After 
McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988). 
 77 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26 (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 
248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918)). 
 78 See id. at 26–27. 
 79 See id. at 27–28. 
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or overreaching.’”80 Such conduct includes embezzlement, which is 
“the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of [property] en-
trusted to one’s care by another.”81 
The Journal had a property right in the exclusive use of confi-
dential information about the columns’ timing and contents.82 In 
breach of his fiduciary obligation to his employer, the defendant 
Winans misappropriated this property for his own use.83 
                                                                                                             
 80 Id. at 27 (quoting United States v. McNally, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). 
 81 Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 82 See id. at 25–27. 
 83 See id. at 25–28. For an extended and insightful discussion of both Car-
penter and McNally, see Craig M. Bradley, Forward: Mail Fraud After McNally 
and Carpenter: The Essence of Fraud, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573 (1988); 
Coffee, supra note 76 (criticizing Carpenter); Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trad-
ing and Intangible Rights: The Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 181, 192–94, 199–214 (1988); Tannenbaum, supra note 2, at 370, 
374–75, 388 (noting Carpenter’s asymmetrical fraud; the defendant’s gain was at 
the cost of innocent stock market investors, who were not victims of defendant’s 
scheme to defraud the Journal of its intangible property right). For a discussion 
of Carpenter’s property right analysis in the context of a general analysis of the 
meaning of “property,” see Francisco J. Morales, Comment, The Property Matrix: 
An Analytical Tool to Answer the Question, “Is This Property?,” 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1125, 1146–49 (2013). 
The court in United States v. Cherif applied Carpenter to affirm multiple 
mail/wire fraud convictions for insider trading. See 943 F.2d 692, 696–99 (7th 
Cir. 1991). The defendant had misappropriated information from a commercial 
bank’s finance department. See id. at 694. The court held that the bank’s right to 
exclusively use its confidential business information was “property” within the 
meaning of the mail and wire fraud statutes. See id. at 697–98. 
Although not a mail/wire fraud case, United States v. Mahaffy involved a charge 
of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1349 
under two theories, one of which was that the defendants deprived their employer 
brokerage firms of the exclusive use of confidential “squawk box” information, 
which qualified as “property” under Carpenter. See 693 F.3d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 
2012). One issue was whether the employers considered the information confi-
dential. See id. at 121–24, 126–33. At trial, one of the defendant’s submitted a 
jury charge that would have defined “confidential business information” along the 
lines of the definition of a “trade secret.” See id. at 134. The trial judge rejected 
that definition as too restrictive, and the Second Circuit agreed. See id. at 134–35. 
For the actual trial court instructions, see id. For discussion of Mahaffy, see Sub-
committee on Annual Review, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, 
ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 
68 BUS. LAW. 839, 938–42 (2013). 
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In the Supreme Court insider trading case of United States v. 
O’Hagan,84 the defendant was a partner of the law firm Dorsey & 
Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota.85 Grand Metropolitan PLC re-
tained Dorsey & Whitney as its local counsel regarding a possible 
tender offer for Pillsbury Corporation.86 O’Hagan purchased both 
Pillsbury call options and stock and made a profit of more than $4.3 
million when he sold after the tender offer announcement.87 The 
United States Attorney prosecuted O’Hagan under fifty-seven 
counts of mail fraud, securities fraud (violations of Section 
10(b)/Rule 10b-588 and Rule 14e-389), and violating federal money 
laundering statutes. The jury convicted O’Hagan of all fifty-seven 
counts.90 
One Government theory was that O’Hagan violated Rule 10b-5 
by trading on material nonpublic information misappropriated from 
two information sources: (1) his direct employer, the law firm of 
which he was a partner, and (2) his law firm’s client, Grand Metro-
politan PLC.91 A majority of the justices affirmed the validity of this 
theory.92 
With virtually no discussion, based on the same breach of duty 
to the two information sources, all nine justices in effect affirmed 
the mail fraud convictions in extremely brief opinions.93 These opin-
ions mentioned neither the “intangible right to honest services” 
                                                                                                             
See generally United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Confiden-
tial information may be considered property for the purposes of §§ 1341 and 
1343.”). 
 84 521 U.S. 642 (1997). For additional discussion of the mail fraud portion of 
O’Hagan, see supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text. 
 85 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id. at 647–48. 
 88 For discussion of O’Hagan’s Rule 10b-5 opinion, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 4.6, 5:4 & nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B]. 
 89 For discussion of O’Hagan’s Rule 14e-3 opinion, see id. § 9.3.3. 
 90 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 648–49. 
 91 See id. at 653, 655 n.6. 
 92 See id. at 649–66. 
 93 See id. at 677–78; id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); id. at 680, 700–01 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
Technically, the Court remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of O’Ha-
gan’s objections to his mail fraud convictions not considered by the Eighth Cir-
cuit. See id. at 677–78. Justice Scalia joined in this part of the majority’s opinion. 
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(since dramatically narrowed by Skilling94) nor the “property right” 
in the information held by both Dorsey & Whitney and its client, 
Grand Metropolitan PLC.95 The majority opinion did, however, re-
affirm: “Just as in Carpenter, so here, the ‘mail fraud charges are 
independent of [the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both 
rest on the same set of facts.’”96 
On remand, in the course of affirming O’Hagan’s mail fraud 
convictions and rejecting his challenge to the wording of the indict-
ment, the Eighth Circuit briefly stated: “The indictment, reasonably 
read, charges O’Hagan with the fraudulent use of confidential busi-
ness information held by Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney. Confi-
dential business information is considered “property” as that term is 
used in the federal mail fraud statute [citing Carpenter].”97 
Earlier, some other mail/wire fraud cases found that a law firm 
had a property interest in the client’s confidential information. For 
example, United States v. Grossman,98 involved an attorney who al-
legedly engaged in insider trading and tipping based on information 
obtained from his law firm’s client.99 The court held that the law 
firm had a mail fraud property interest in the information because of 
the reputational value of preserving client confidences.100 
Similarly, United States v. Elliott,101 concluded that the Seventh 
Circuit implicitly endorsed Grossman in FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 
                                                                                                             
See id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in this part of the majority’s opinion. See 
id. at 680, 700–01 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
On remand, the Eighth Circuit affirmed O’Hagan’s convictions on the mail fraud 
and other counts. See United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 94 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010). For discussion of Skilling, 
see supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 95 See supra citations in note 93. Justice Thomas said: “As I read the indict-
ment, it does not materially differ with the indictment in Carpenter v. United 
States . . . .” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 700 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 96 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678 (bracketed material in original) (quoting Brief 
for United States 46–47). 
 97 United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 651 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 98 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 99 See id. at 79–82. 
 100 See id. at 85–86. For discussion of Grossman, see Dreeben, supra note 83, 
at 208–09. 
 101 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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F.2d 981, 992 n.21 (7th Cir. 1988).102 Elliott also stated that even 
had the Seventh Circuit not endorsed Grossman, two additional rea-
sons existed for viewing confidential information from clients as 
law firm property (for the purposes of wire fraud): (1) the infor-
mation is used to produce legal advice and has as much economic 
value to a law firm as a word processor or a copying machine; and 
(2) the information is held by the law firm for the benefit of the cli-
ent, and a person has a property interest in property held for the ben-
efit of another.103 
The prosecution could finesse the issue of whether the law firm 
has a property interest in client information by charging that the in-
sider trading attorney deprived or interfered with the client’s prop-
erty interest in its confidential information, rather than the law firm’s 
property interest in the client information.104 
Suppose the information source is a relative, rather than an em-
ployer. In some situations the information source conceivably might 
have a property interest in exclusive use of the information. For ex-
ample, an individual or family might have a property interest in in-
formation about its investment plans. 
In United States v. Chestman,105 however, a majority of the Sec-
ond Circuit en banc panel reversed the mail fraud convictions of a 
defendant whose tipper had allegedly breached a confidence of a 
spouse.106 The defendant, Robert Chestman, had purchased 
Waldbaum, Inc. shares based on material nonpublic information 
about a forthcoming tender offer for the stock.107 
Chestman learned about the offer through the following chain. 
Ira Waldbaum was the president and controlling shareholder of 
                                                                                                             
 102 See id. at 426–28. 
 103 See id. at 428. 
 104 United States v. Elliott held that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the 
indicted law firm partner, Elliott, defrauded both his law firm and its clients of 
confidential information. See id. at 428–29. 
For discussion of the Supreme Court decision of O’Hagan, which, with little dis-
cussion, in effect affirmed the mail fraud convictions of a law firm partner who 
traded on client information and misappropriated the informational property of 
both the law firm and the client, see supra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. 
For discussion of the Eighth Circuit O’Hagan opinion (on remand) that affirmed 
the mail fraud convictions, see supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 105 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 106 See id. at 571. 
 107 See id. at 555–56. 
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Waldbaum, Inc.108 He agreed to sell Waldbaum, Inc. to another 
company and to tender his control block to this acquirer.109 Mr. 
Waldbaum informed his sister, Shirley Waldbaum Witkin, about the 
offer so that she could tender her shares along with his.110 Ms. 
Witkin told her daughter, Susan Loeb.111 Ms. Loeb passed the news 
to her husband, Keith Loeb.112 Mr. Loeb in turn relayed the infor-
mation to his stockbroker, Robert Chestman.113 
The sole defendant was Robert Chestman.114 The court reversed 
his conviction under Rule 10b-5 because his immediate information 
source (tipper), Keith Loeb, did not violate the rule.115 The decision 
exonerated Keith Loeb because of lack of evidence that he either (1) 
had a fiduciary relationship or its “functional equivalent” with his 
wife or the initial information source (the Waldbaum family), or (2) 
had accepted a duty of confidentiality when receiving the infor-
mation from his wife.116 
After an extensive discussion of Rule 10b-5, the opinion spent 
only one paragraph on mail fraud.117 The court reversed the mail 
fraud convictions for the same reason that it reversed the Rule 10b-
5 convictions: “The fortunes of Chestman’s mail fraud convictions 
are tied closely to his securities fraud convictions . . . . [W]hatever 
ethical obligation Loeb may have owed the Waldbaum family or 
Susan Loeb [his wife], it was too ethereal to be protected by either 
the securities or mail fraud statutes.”118 
In Chestman, Judge Winter dissented from the majority’s rever-
sal of both the Section 10(b) and mail fraud convictions.119 Unlike 
                                                                                                             
 108 See id. at 555. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id. at 554, 556. 
 115 See id. at 571. 
 116 See id. at 567–71. For additional discussion of Chestman’s analysis of Rule 
10b-5, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[E]. At least partly because 
of Chestman, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, which furnishes a nonexclusive list 
of three circumstances when a person has a duty of trust and confidence under the 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine. For discussion of the rule, see id. 
 117 See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See id. at 572–82 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the majority, he expressly recognized that mail fraud and Rule 10b-
5 misappropriation have different foundations and could have dis-
parate results.120 Nevertheless, after an extensive discussion of Sec-
tion 10(b),121 he took only two paragraphs to support the mail fraud 
convictions.122 His reason was that “under any . . . disparity in rules 
the Section 10(b) charge would be harder to prove than a mail fraud 
charge . . . .”123 
Judge Winter is correct in noting that mail fraud and Rule 10b-
5 misappropriation are not equivalent. Mail fraud is based on a dep-
rivation of money or tangible or intangible “property.” Rule 10b-5 
misappropriation involves a breach of duty to the information source 
(in connection with a securities transaction).124 
Before the Supreme Court’s validation of the Rule 10b-5 misap-
propriation doctrine in United States v. O’Hagan,125 critics ad-
vanced several arguments against the theory: (1) the doctrine en-
compasses conduct not deceitful within the meaning of Exchange 
Act section 10(b);126 (2) misappropriation is not fraud “in connec-
                                                                                                             
 120 See id. at 581–82 (Winter, J., dissenting) (“Logic is therefore certainly not 
a barrier to the growth of disparate rules concerning a tippee’s liability depending 
on whether Section 10(b) or mail fraud is the source of law.”). For a longer quo-
tation from the same portion of the opinion, see infra text at note 256. 
 121 See id. at 572–81. For related discussion, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 5.4.3[E] n.753. 
 122 See id. at 581–82. 
 123 See id. at 582 (Winter J., dissenting). 
 124 For discussion of the misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5, see WANG 
& STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4. 
For examples of insider trading cases providing a significant separate analysis of 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and mail/wire fraud liability, see United States v. 
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 
1983) (unpublished order); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); United States v. Elliott, 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussed supra 
at notes 101–03 and accompanying text; infra notes 208–14 and accompanying 
text). For additional discussion of Newman and Willis, see infra note 137. 
 125 521 U.S. 642, 649–66 (1997). 
 126 See United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617–19 (8th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 
521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944–49 (4th Cir. 1995); 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §5.4.1 nn.584–97, 606 and accompanying 
text. 
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tion with the purchase or sale of any security” as required by Ex-
change Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5127 because the mis-
conduct has too tenuous a link with a securities transaction;128 (3) 
more generally, an overly broad prohibition of insider trading may 
frustrate “the need to allow persons to profit from generating infor-
mation about firms so that the pricing of securities is efficient.”129 
                                                                                                             
 127 For discussion of the “in connection with” requirement under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.5, 6.13. 
 128 See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949-50, 959. See also id. at 943–59 (rejecting the 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory). For discussion of Bryan, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.5.2[A], 5.4.1[A]. 
The Eighth Circuit followed Bryan and rejected the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation 
theory, in part because of the “in connection with” requirement. See United States 
v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 619–20 (8th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642, 649–66 
(1997). 
In their dissenting opinion in O’Hagan, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that the conduct encompassed by the Rule 10b-5 misappro-
priation doctrine does not meet the “in connection with” requirement. See O’Ha-
gan, 521 U.S. at 680–92 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
For discussion of whether the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory satisfies Sec-
tion 10(b)’s “in connection with” requirement, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 4.5.2. 
For discussion of theoretical problems with the misappropriation doctrine under 
Rule 10b-5, see William K.S. Wang, Post-Chiarella Developments in Rule 10b-5, 
15 REV. SEC. REG. 956, 959–61 (1982). 
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court majority rejected the argument that the defendant 
misappropriator’s misconduct had too tenuous a link with a securities transaction. 
See 521 U.S. at 655–66. For discussion of this part of O’Hagan, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.5.2[B]. For additional discussion of O’Hagan, see 
id. §§ 5.4 & nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B]. 
 129 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 581 (2d. Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(Winter, J., dissenting). Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (“Imposing a 
duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material 
nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting 
influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is nec-
essary to the preservation of a healthy market.”); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 
1, § 5.2.3[F] n.317 and accompanying text (discussing this language in Dirks). 
For related discussion, see id. § 2.2.2. 
For discussion of possible special Rule 10b-5 insider trading solicitude for ana-
lysts, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.3[C][2] n.168, 5.2.3[F] n.317 
and accompanying text; Dreeben, supra note 83, at 211–12. See also Chestman, 
947 F.2d at 581 (Winter, J., dissenting) (quoted supra in text at this note). For 
discussion of a possible enhanced Rule 10b-5 insider trading obligation for bro-
ker-dealers, see id. § 5.2.3[F]. 
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If one rejects these arguments, Judge Winter may sometimes be 
incorrect in concluding that, in insider trading cases, a Rule 10b-5 
violation is harder to prove than mail fraud. In certain instances, a 
breach of a fiduciary or “fiduciary-like” duty to an information 
source (Rule 10b-5 misappropriation) may be easier (rather than 
harder) to find than a deprivation of “property” under mail and wire 
fraud. For example, when someone breaches the confidence of a rel-
ative, as alleged in Chestman, a breach of duty to the information 
source might seem a more plausible theory than one based on loss 
of “property.”130 
In any event, other judicial opinions appear to support Judge 
Winter’s conclusion that, with inside trading criminal cases, Rule 
10b-5 misappropriation is more difficult to prove than mail and wire 
fraud. In Carpenter itself, the Supreme Court split evenly on the 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions, but unanimously upheld 
the mail/wire fraud convictions based on the deprivation of confi-
dential information-property.131 Further, in their concurring and dis-
senting opinion in O’Hagan, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that they would reverse O’Hagan’s convictions un-
der Rule 10b-5 (because of a rejection of the Rule 10b-5 misappro-
priation doctrine), but in effect sustain O’Hagan’s mail fraud con-
victions.132 Justice Thomas (and Chief Justice Rehnquist) com-
mented: 
While the majority may find it strange that the “mail 
fraud net” is broader reaching than the securities 
fraud net, any such supposed strangeness—and the 
resulting allocation of prosecutorial responsibility 
                                                                                                             
 130 Nevertheless, the court in United States v. Reed treated Rule 10b-5 misap-
propriation and wire fraud as equivalent and refused to dismiss indictments 
against a son for trading on material nonpublic information misappropriated from 
his father. See 601 F. Supp. 685, 695–720 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d on other 
grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1983). Reed is overshadowed and limited by 
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569–70 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). For 
discussion of Chestman overshadowing and limiting Reed, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[E], at 448–49. At least partly in reaction to 
Chestman, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2 (discussed supra in note 116). 
 131 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For discussion of Car-
penter, see supra notes 58–83 and accompanying text. 
 132 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 680–701 (Thomas, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
2015] MAIL, WIRE FRAUD STATUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING 257 
between the Commission and the various United 
States Attorneys—is no business of this Court, and 
can be adequately addressed by Congress if it too 
perceives a problem regarding jurisdictional bound-
aries among the Nation’s prosecutors.133 
                                                                                                             
 133 Id. at 701 n.13. 
Invoking the rule of lenity, Justice Scalia, with almost no discussion, said that he 
also would reverse the Rule 10b-5 convictions but in effect affirm the mail fraud 
convictions. See id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
For additional discussion of these two concurring and dissenting opinions and 
their concurrence with the majority’s remand for consideration of defendant ar-
guments not considered by the Eighth Circuit, see supra note 93. For discussion 
of the majority’s mail fraud holding in O’Hagan, see supra notes 84–96. For dis-
cussion of the rule of lenity (strict construction of criminal statutes in favor of the 
defendant), see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.5.2[B] n. 495. 
The O’Hagan majority did not indicate whether securities fraud is narrower or 
broader than mail/wire fraud. See 521 U.S. at 677–78. Nevertheless, the majority 
did reaffirm: “Just as in Carpenter, so here, the ‘mail fraud charges are independ-
ent of [the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both rest on the same set of 
facts.’” 521 U.S. at 678 (bracketed material in original) (quoting Brief for United 
States 46-47). For earlier discussion of this portion of O’Hagan, see supra note 
96 and accompanying text. For a longer quotation including this language, see 
infra text accompanying note 137. 
Two Fourth Circuit cases affirmed the convictions of insider trading defendants 
under mail and/or wire fraud, while reversing their convictions under Rule 10b-5 
(because of a rejection of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine). See United 
States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 965–67 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bryan, 
58 F.3d 933, 943–59 (4th Cir. 1995). Bryan expressed a lack of concern for the 
consequences of its rejection of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine because 
much of the conduct covered by that doctrine is also covered by the Rule 10b-5 
classical relationship theory or mail/wire fraud. See 58 F.3d at 953. ReBrook relied 
both on Carpenter (dividing evenly on Rule 10b-5 misappropriation; yet uphold-
ing the mail/wire fraud convictions based on deprivation of information-property) 
and “holdings of various courts that there is no multiplicity issue when prosecut-
ing the same purchase or sale of securities under both the securities fraud statute 
and the wire fraud statute.” ReBrook, 58 F.3d at 967. 
These two Fourth Circuit opinions, however, relied on the 1988 Congressional 
amendment extending mail/wire fraud to the “the deprivation of the intangible 
right to honest services.” See Rebrook, 58 F.3d at 966; Bryan, 58 F.3d at 939–43. 
The two decisions predate Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), which 
held that the 1988 amendment covers only bribery and kickback schemes. For 
discussion of the 1988 amendment, see supra note 71 and accompanying text. For 
discussion of Skilling, see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
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For discussion of cases, including Carpenter, that seem willing to expand 
mail/wire fraud beyond securities fraud, see Dreeben, supra note 83, at 189–91, 
199–214. 
Pre-Skilling, two commentators suggested that mail/wire fraud is more expansive 
than federal securities law: 
But in the other major area of securities law violations, insider 
trading and “misappropriation,” we again, as under § 1346, en-
counter struggles to define fiduciary duty and to find identifia-
ble victims of obviously bad actors. Put simply, securities fraud, 
as embodied by § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and by Rule 10b-5, requires a “fraud,” and the question to ex-
plore then is whether securities fraud has come to conceive vic-
tim-hood as broadly and amorphously as mail fraud. 
Mills & Weisberg, supra note 21, at 1425. 
Similarly, the same article noted: 
One subsidiary effect of the expansion of mail fraud law has 
been to reconfirm that it can do the work of securities fraud by 
treating insider trading cases as instances of theft. Under mail 
and wire fraud law, we have a progressively vaguer standard 
and a greater reach of inchoate crime doctrine . . . . Section 1348 
[§ 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, adding 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1348, a new crime of “securities fraud”] . . . might suggest a 
way for prosecutors to use mail and wire fraud even more ex-
pansively as a substitute for SEC laws . . . .The new law might, 
in effect, moot the need for the government to use the insider 
trading or misappropriation doctrines . . . . 
Id. at 1437–38. For discussion of § 1348, see supra note 21. 
For additional pre-Skilling commentary arguing that, with respect to insider trad-
ing, mail/wire fraud may have a broader application than Rule 10b-5 misappro-
priation, see Stephen H. Case & Jimmy H. Morales, Landmark Cases and Con-
cepts in the Law of “Insider” or “Breach of Duty” Trading Under Federal Secu-
rities, Mail and Wire Fraud Laws: A Primer for Working and Chapter 11 Law-
yers, C647 ALI-ABA 163, 173 (Sept. 28, 1991) ( “[C]riminal insider trading 
charges [under] . . . mail and wire fraud are easier to prove.”); Humke, supra note 
43, at 842–44. 
One treatise said: 
The mail and wire fraud statutes do not specify who needs to be 
defrauded. They thereby neatly avoid the Chiarella requirement 
of fiduciary duty to the opposite party to the securities trade. 
And they neatly achieve the objective of misrepresentation the-
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ory to find violation when MNPI [material non-public infor-
mation] is taken from someone unrelated to the opposite party 
or to the issuer of the security. 
3 BROMBERG, LOWENFELS, & SULLIVAN, supra note 13, § 6:372, at 6-1009. 
Computer hacking may sometimes escape liability under either mail/wire fraud or 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation, but may possibly be more likely to escape liability 
under Rule 10b-5. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, 
574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009), involved a defendant who traded on material nonpub-
lic information obtained through computer hacking. The court stated: 
Based on the evidence provided at the November 28, 2007 hear-
ing there would appear to be sufficient basis to conclude that 
Dorozhko’s hack violated the . . . mail fraud statute . . . and the 
wire fraud statute . . . .However, since the SEC has apparently 
declined, for whatever reason, to involve the criminal authori-
ties in this case, we must address an inconvenient truth about 
our securities laws . . . .Upon a searching review of existing case 
law, and for the reasons that follow, we believe that we are con-
strained to hold that Dorozhko’s alleged ‘stealing and trading’ 
or ‘hacking and trading’ does not amount to a violation of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 because Dorozhko did not breach any 
fiduciary or similar duty “in connection with” the purchase or 
sale of a security. 
Id. at 324. 
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed and held that breach of fiduciary 
duty was not a prerequisite to Rule 10b-5 “deceit” and that, depending on the 
facts, the defendant’s hacking might (or might not) involve the “deceit” required 
for Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 46–51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
When discussing the issue whether computer hackers are Rule 10b-5 misappro-
priators, one article said: “Under the traditional view, they would have to be pun-
ished for their misdeeds via mail fraud, wire fraud, simple theft, or other compa-
rable statutes.” Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future 
of Insider Trading Regulation, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH 263, 298 (1999). 
In at least one respect, mail/wire fraud is broader than SEC Rule 10b-5. The latter 
covers only conduct “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security. See 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.5. For related discussion, see supra notes 
126-27 and accompanying text. Mail/wire fraud is not so limited. See MARVIN G. 
PICKHOLZ, PETER J. HENNING & JASON R. PICKHOLZ, 21 SECURITIES CRIMES 
§ 6:29 (2014); Case & Morales, supra, at 173; Ted Kamman & Roy T. Hood, With 
the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, 
How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 357, 393–97 (application of mail/wire fraud to insider trading in 
non-securities-based swap agreements). For a general discussion of the federal 
regulation of insider trading in derivatives, see Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading in 
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Derivatives Markets, 103 GEO. L.J. 381, 407–09 (2015) (discussing SEC and 
CFTC regulations). 
For an argument for increased regulation of insider trading in the commodities 
markets, see Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 101 VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). Normally, commodities are not securities under the 
federal securities laws. See 7 HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.6[6] (“Commodities 
themselves and commodities futures are not securities.”). For examples of cases 
applying mail/wire fraud to commodities or commodities futures transactions, see 
United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1014 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying mail fraud 
to cocoa futures); United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing mail and wire fraud to silver futures). For related discussion, see infra notes 
142–43 and accompanying text. See generally Gretchen Morgenson, Vague 
Words That Imperil Investors, NY TIMES, Aug. 23, 2015, Sunday Business, at 1, 
5 (“Prohibitions against insider trading apply only to securities . . . .Investors tak-
ing the view that leveraged loans are not securities have contended that their trad-
ing on such information is not bound by these rules.”). 
As mentioned earlier, section 807 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes 
criminal penalties for: “[w]hoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a 
scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud any person in connection with . . . any security 
of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (emphasis added). For the conclu-
sion that section 807’s “in connection with” language is broader than Section 
10(b)’s “in connection with the purchase or sale,” see Mills & Weisberg, supra 
note 21, at 1425. For additional discussion of section 807, see supra note 21. 
This Article discusses criminal liability. When bringing Rule 10b-5 civil actions 
against insider trading defendants, the SEC has a laxer burden of proof, and the 
culpability requirement of the defendant may be lower than in a criminal proceed-
ing. See Outlook 2015: Securities Litigation and Enforcement, 27 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) 129 (Jan. 29, 2015). 
For discussion of the intent requirement for mail/wire fraud, see supra notes 19–
20 and accompanying text. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement 
and its application to insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 4.4. For discussion of the special features of the Rule 10b-5 scienter of 
tippers and tippees, see id. § 4.4.5. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 “personal 
benefit” requirement for initial tipper liability, see infra notes 216, 220–29 and 
accompanying text. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 “know or should know of 
initial tipper’s violation” requirement for tippee liability, see infra notes 217–19 
and accompanying text. For discussion of the sometimes blurry distinction be-
tween the scienter and “personal benefit” requirements, see infra notes 226–30 
and accompanying text. 
Just as mail/wire fraud overlaps somewhat with Exchange Act § 10(b) and SEC 
Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court has held that Exchange Act § 10(b) and SEC Rule 
10b-5 overlap with more specific anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–87 (1983) 
(unanimous decision) (recognizing overlap with express private remedy of Secu-
rities Act of 1933 § 11); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468–69 (1969) 
2015] MAIL, WIRE FRAUD STATUTES FOR INSIDER TRADING AND TIPPING 261 
Nevertheless, other judicial opinions seem to support the alter-
native conclusion that Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and mail/wire 
fraud are equally difficult to demonstrate. The majority opinion in 
O’Hagan analogized mail/wire fraud to the Rule 10b-5 misappro-
priation theory and cited the mail/wire fraud decision of Carpenter 
as precedent for the validity of the misappropriation doctrine.134 The 
Court noted:   
Carpenter’s discussion of the fraudulent misuse of 
confidential information, the Government notes, “is 
a particularly apt source of guidance here, because 
[the mail fraud statute] (like Section 10(b)) has long 
been held to require deception, not merely the breach 
of a fiduciary duty.”135 
Furthermore, the majority opinion in O’Hagan spent only a few 
sentences to affirm (in effect) the mail fraud convictions136 and com-
mented: 
Just as in Carpenter so here, the “mail fraud charges 
are independent of [the] securities fraud charges, 
even [though] both rest on the same set of facts.” 
Brief for United States 46–47. We need not linger 
over this matter, for our rulings on the securities 
fraud issues [in effect affirming convictions under 
the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory] require that 
we reverse the Court of Appeals judgment on the 
mail fraud counts as well.”137 
                                                                                                             
(recognizing overlap with Exchange Act § 14 and stating “The fact that there may 
well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate.”). 
 134 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654. 
 135 Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 18, n.9 (citation omitted)). 
 136 See id. at 677–78. 
 137 Id. at 678. (Technically, the Court remanded to the Eighth Circuit for con-
sideration of O’Hagan’s objections to his Rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions 
not considered by the Eighth Circuit. See id. at 666, 677-78.) At least on the facts 
of that case, the Court viewed Rule 10b-5 misappropriation as equivalent to 
mail/wire fraud. For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 portion of O’Hagan, see WANG 
& STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 5.4 & nn.550–53, 5.4.1[B]. 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit opinion reversed by the Supreme Court in O’Hagan 
spent only one paragraph reversing his mail fraud convictions after reversing his 
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Rule 10b-5 convictions. See United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 627–28 (8th 
Cir. 1995), rev’d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The Eighth Circuit did acknowledge, how-
ever: “The mere fact that O’Hagan’s securities convictions are reversed does not 
as a matter of law require that the mail fraud convictions likewise be reversed.” 
Id. at 627. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit affirmed O’Ha-
gan’s convictions on the mail fraud and other counts. See United States v. O’Ha-
gan, 139 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1998). 
The insider trading portion of United States v. Royer discussed wire fraud and 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions jointly and affirmed them. See 549 F.3d 
886, 897–99 (2d Cir. 2008). 
In a Rule 10b-5 misappropriation case, SEC v. Rocklage, the defendant disclosed 
to her information-source, her husband, her intent to convey material nonpublic 
information to her brother shortly before she actually did so. See 470 F.3d 1, 3 
(1st Cir. 2006). In the course of affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, the circuit court relied on the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
mail/wire fraud in Carpenter: “In related areas of the law [mail/wire fraud], it is 
well accepted that a scheme can be deceptive or fraudulent even if not all parts of 
the scheme are deceptive or fraudulent.” Id. at 13. For discussion of Rocklage and 
Rule 10b-5 “brazen misappropriation,” see FERRARA, NAGY, & THOMAS, supra 
note 21, § 2.02[6][iii]; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.1[B] & nn.613–
14. 
In about two and a half pages, the court in United States v. Ruggiero affirmed the 
securities and wire fraud convictions of an insider trading defendant. See 56 F.3d 
647, 653–56 (5th Cir. 1995). The two-paragraph wire fraud discussion was based 
on the court’s conclusion about securities fraud. See id. at 656. For additional 
discussion of Ruggiero, see infra notes 167–76, 253–56 and accompanying text. 
In United States v. Kim, the government accused the defendant of insider trading 
and charged him with one count of wire fraud, two counts of securities fraud, and 
one count of making a false statement. See 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1008–09 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002). The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss both the securities 
fraud counts and the wire fraud count. See id. at 1009, 1015. The opinion spent 
almost seven pages discussing whether to dismiss the securities fraud count based 
on the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory. See id. at 1009–15. After dismissing 
the securities fraud counts, the judge dismissed the wire fraud count in just a few 
sentences: 
The alleged fraud underlying the securities fraud charges also 
serves as the basis for the wire fraud charge. As the government 
concedes, a wire fraud conviction must be based on a breach of 
an underlying duty. For the reasons stated above no such duty 
is present here. Accordingly, the indictment also fails to allege 
a wire fraud violation. 
Id. at 1015. 
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation portion of Kim, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[J]. 
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In SEC v. Zandford, the district court had entered summary judgment against the 
defendant under Rule 10b-5 based on his criminal conviction for wire fraud. See 
535 U.S. 813, 816 (2002). The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s dis-
missal of the complaint, but did not reach the issue of whether to affirm the sum-
mary judgment. See id. at 818. 
United States v. Eisenberg, 773 F. Supp. 662, 721 (D.N.J. 1991), stated: 
Because mail and wire fraud violations are premised on use of 
the mails and wires to execute a scheme to defraud, the parties 
appear to be correct in their contention that the most important 
question is whether the Defendants’ conduct constituted fraud 
within the meaning of the securities laws. 
Although overshadowed and limited by Chestman v. United States, 947 F.2d 551, 
569–70 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), the insider trading case of United States v. Reed, 
601 F. Supp. 685, 695–720 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 
(2d Cir. 1983), treated Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and wire fraud as equivalent 
when refusing to dismiss indictments. For discussion of Chestman’s overshadow-
ing and limiting Reed, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.3[E], at 448–
49. 
The majority in Chestman itself spent about five and a half pages on the reversal 
of the defendant’s Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions. See Chestman, 947 
F.2d at 566–71. The opinion then devoted only one paragraph on the reversal of 
his mail fraud convictions. See id. at 571 (“The fortunes of Chestman’s mail fraud 
convictions are tied closely to his securities fraud convictions.”). 
The insider trading case of United States v. Newman spent about three and a half 
pages refusing to dismiss the indictment for Rule 10b-5 misappropriation and 
slightly over one page refusing to dismiss the mail fraud indictment. See 664 F.2d 
12, 15–20 (2d Cir. 1981), aff’d after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983) (un-
published order). Nevertheless, the court separately analyzed the two indictments. 
See id. 
Similarly, United States v. Willis, involved a psychiatrist who allegedly traded on 
information from a patient. See 737 F. Supp. 259, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The opin-
ion spent about four and a quarter pages refusing to dismiss the Rule 10b-5 mis-
appropriation counts and only about one page refusing the dismiss the mail fraud 
counts. See id. at 271–76. Nevertheless, the court analyzed the two issues sepa-
rately. See id. 
Although noting the mail/wire fraud is not confined to “securities” and is in that 
respect broader than SEC Rule 10b-5, two co-authors concluded: “since the mail 
and wire fraud statutes require a misappropriation theory, they, like the insider 
trading laws under Rule 10b-5, are limited by the constraints of this theory . . . .” 
Kamman & Hood, supra note 133, at 396. 
Similarly, another article states: 
In practice, the interpretations of the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes seem to follow the interpretation of Section 
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2. THE PARTY ON THE OTHER SIDE AS VICTIM 
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, a stock market insider trader has a duty 
to disclose material information to the party on the other side of the 
trade only when the two have a so-called “classical relationship.”138 
This duty is breached by the material nondisclosure accompanying 
the insider trade. For many reasons, the Rule 10b-5 “classical rela-
tionship” theory may not be available. One possible example is a 
corporate insider trading in the company’s debt instruments; it is un-
clear whether a “classical relationship” exists with the party on the 
other side of the trade.139 
                                                                                                             
10(b) . . . .Courts generally decide the merits of the 10b-5 [mis-
appropriation] action; the mail and wire fraud counts are dis-
posed of briefly, in the same fashion and with the same stated 
rationale as the 10b-5 counts. 
Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 231, 
260 (2001) (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571). 
Based on Carpenter, one treatise concludes “it seems clear that virtually all insider 
trading cases will also be mail and wire fraud cases, whether under the misappro-
priation theory . . . .” 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: 
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 8:14, at 8–49 (2014). 
One commentator has claimed: “Congress must have had the mail-fraud statute in 
mind when it drafted section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, [and] section 10(b) of the 
1934 Act . . . .” Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future After 
Stoneridge?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 351, 384. See id. at. 365 n.77 (“Rule 10b-5’s 
scheme to defraud language was copied from section 17(a) of the 1933 
Act . . . .Congress derived that language, in turn, from the mail-fraud stat-
ute . . . .”); Strader, supra note 20, at 1455 (section 10(b) “was modeled on the 
federal mail fraud statute”; footnote omitted). 
Citing Prentice, the insider trading case of United States v. Whitman said: “Rule 
10b–5 . . . was loosely modeled on the federal mail fraud statute . . . .” 904 F. 
Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 555 F. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). For 
related discussion of Whitman, see infra note 251 and accompanying text. Cf. SEC 
v. Clark, 915 F.2d 915, 448 (9th Cir. 1990) (“For guidance in determining whether 
the misappropriation theory fits within the concept of ‘fraud’ in § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, we look to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which contain similar lan-
guage.”). 
 138 For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory, see United 
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014); WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, §§ 5.2, 5.3. 
 139 See id. § 5.2.6[C]; Kamman & Hood, supra note 133, at 391–93. 
Another illustration is the following: based on material nonpublic information 
about her company, a corporate insider might trade other corporations’ stock, e.g., 
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With stock market insider trading, an alternative to the Rule 10b-
5 “classical relationship” theory is Rule 10b-5 misappropriation.140 
Of course, if the insider trade is in an item, not a “security” under 
the federal securities laws,141 e.g., a commodity,142 then Rule 10b-5 
does not apply.143 
Somewhat similar to Rule 10b-5 misappropriation is mail/wire 
fraud on the information-owner.144 Suppose, however, neither Rule 
10b-5 misappropriation nor mail/wire fraud on the information-
owner is applicable, perhaps because the information source/owner 
gave permission to trade or tip,145 or possibly because the defendant 
disclosed in advance to the information source/owner the plan to 
                                                                                                             
shares of her company’s rivals, suppliers, customers, or the manufacturers of com-
plementary products. For discussion of insider trading in such stock “substitutes” 
(stock of a different issuer), see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.6[D]; 
Ayres & Bankman, supra note 137. For an empirical study of such trading, see 
Mihir N. Mehta, David M. Reeb, & Wanli Zhao, Shadow Trading: Do Insiders 
Exploit Private Information About Stakeholders? (forthcoming; available on 
ssrn.com). 
Sometimes, someone in the “classical relationship triangle” tips an outsider, and 
the insider/tipper and/or the outsider/tippee is not liable. For discussion of “clas-
sical relationship” tipper/tippee liability, see infra Part II(B)(5); WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8, 5.3. 
In the Supreme Court case that created the “classical relationship” theory, Chi-
arella v. United States, the defendant himself was not liable under the doctrine. 
See 445 U.S. 222, 225–35 (1980); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1. 
 140 For discussion of the SEC Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, see 
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445–46 (2d Cir. 2014); WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4. For discussion of the overlap between the SEC 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine and the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” 
theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.11. 
 141 For discussion of the definition of “security” under the federal securities 
laws, see 3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF. SECURITIES AND 
FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW 2D §§ 2:1–2:105 (2d ed. 2014); 2 BROMBERG, 
LOWENFELS, & SULLIVAN, supra note 13, §§ 4.9-4.51; 7 HAZEN, supra note 18, 
§ 1.6; 2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN, & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 3(A)(1) (3d ed. 2014). For related discussion, see supra note 133. 
 142 See 7 HAZEN, supra note 18, § 1.6[6] (“Commodities themselves and com-
modities futures are not securities.”). For related discussion, see supra note 133. 
 143 For related discussion, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, 133. 
 144 See supra Part II(B)(1). 
 145 For discussion of why no Rule 10b-5 misappropriation occurs if the infor-
mation source grants permission to trade or tip, see United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, 653–55, 659 n.9 (1997); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4 
nn.551–53 and accompanying text. 
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trade or tip.146 Also, assume that SEC Rule 14e-3 is not available 
because the insider trading or tipping does not relate to an actual or 
possible tender offer.147 
In this situation, an alternative theory of mail/wire fraud liability 
arises from the possible victim: the party on the other side of the 
insider trade.148 The latter more closely resembles the classic fraud 
victim, who is induced to buy or sell by a material misstatement or 
nondisclosure. Mail and wire fraud can cover misstatements to 
someone on the other side of a transaction.149 For nondisclosure to 
                                                                                                             
 146 For discussion of why Rule 10b-5 misappropriation might not occur if the 
defendant discloses in advance to the information source the plan to trade or tip, 
see O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653–55, 659 n.9; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, 
§ 5.4.1[B] nn.612–14 and accompanying text. But cf. SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 
1 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussed supra note 144 and in WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 5.4.1[B] n.613). For additional discussion, see supra note 144. 
Unclear is whether such advance disclosure would avoid mail/wire fraud liability 
for misappropriation of confidential informational property. For related discus-
sion, see supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
For discussion of loopholes in both the SEC Rule 10b-5 classical relationship and 
misappropriation doctrines, see Kamman & Hood, supra note 133 at 376–400. 
Computer hacking may sometimes escape liability under either theory. See supra 
note140. 
 147 For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, 
ch. 9. 
For discussion of its limitation to the tender offer context, see id. § 9.1. 
 148 For discussion of why the issuer should not be able to immunize its em-
ployees or independent contractors from Rule 10b-5 liability by granting permis-
sion for them to trade on material nonpublic information, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.1[B] nn.613–22 and accompanying text. 
For discussion of why advance disclosure to the issuer does not exonerate an in-
sider from trading or tipping in violation of Rule 10b-5 under the “classical rela-
tionship” theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.1[B] nn.613–22 
and accompanying text. 
 149 See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (involving used 
car distributor who bought used cars, rolled back their odometers, and then sold 
the cars to retail dealers); United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962) (to obtain 
advance fees for company, officers, directors, and employees of a corporation 
made lavish representations about the services company would provide; defend-
ants did not intend to, and in fact did not make any substantial effort to perform 
the promised services); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (applying the 
mail fraud statute to defendants who duped a woman into advancing $35,000 to-
ward a fictitious hotel deal); United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(materially misleading representations to potential investors); United States v. Lo-
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ayza, 107 F.3d 257, 267 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming mail fraud convictions of de-
fendants who devised a Ponzi scheme to induce individuals to invest). See also 
United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283–84 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming convic-
tion of defendant who deprived lender “of information [materially] relevant to its 
decision whether it would extend him a loan”; facts involved affirmative misrep-
resentation); Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“all the [mail fraud] statute punishes is deliberate fraud . . . where in order to get 
money or something else of monetizable value from someone you make a state-
ment to him that you know to be false, or a half truth that you know to be mis-
leading, expecting him to act upon it to your benefit and his detriment.”); 2 
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:48 nn.567, 571 and accompanying text. 
For an opinion affirming the conviction of a defendant for aiding and abetting a 
classic face to face wire fraud scheme involving duping two investors into making 
a “guaranteed” investment in a company and then embezzling the funds invested, 
see United States v. Pol-Flores, 644 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2011). 
With reference to the mail fraud statute, one commentator noted: “Congress al-
most surely contemplated a classic fraud in which the victim is induced by false 
representations to hand over money or tangible property to the defendant and the 
victim’s loss is the defendant’s gain.” Bradley, supra note 83, at 594. 
The language of both the mail and wire fraud statutes clearly covers “obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises . . . .” For the language of the mail and wire fraud statutes, see supra 
notes 11, 12. 
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that party to constitute mail and wire fraud, however, the defendant 
must have a duty to disclose to the victim,150 although what creates 
such a duty is not so clear.151 
                                                                                                             
 150 See United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We 
have also held that a defendant’s non-action or non-disclosure of material facts 
intended to create a false and fraudulent representation may constitute a violation 
of the mail fraud statute where the defendant had a duty, explicit or implicit, to 
disclose material information.”) (citing United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 
571 (11th Cir. 1995)); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1065 
(11th Cir. 2007) (“‘[N]ondisclosure of material information can constitute a vio-
lation of the mail and wire fraud statutes where a defendant has a duty to disclose 
either by statute or otherwise.’”) (quoting McCulloch v. PNC Bank Inc., 298 F.3d 
1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“[A] seller or middleman may be liable for [wire] fraud if he lies to the 
purchaser or tells him misleading half-truths, but not if he simply fails to disclose 
information that he is under no obligation to reveal.”); Kemp v. AT&T Co., 393 
F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 
F.3d 514 (11th Cir. 2000)); Ayres, 234 F.3d at 521 (although finding no mail or 
wire fraud violations, stating “Plaintiffs rely primarily upon the theory that non-
disclosure of material information can constitute a violation of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes where a defendant has a duty to disclose. Ample case law supports 
Plaintiffs’ legal theory.”); Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 70–71 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (“It would be a truly revolutionary change to make a criminal out of 
every salesman (assuming use of the mails or telephone) who did not take the 
initiative to reveal negative information about the product and who—a jury might 
find—harbored in his heart the hope that the buyer would never ask.”); United 
States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 664–67 (10th Cir. 1997) (reversing convictions 
for nondisclosure because of lack of duty, although stating in passing dictum: 
“Even apart from a fiduciary duty, in the context of certain transactions, ‘a mis-
leading omission[ ] is actionable as fraud . . . if it is intended to induce a false 
belief and resulting action to the advantage of the misleader and the disadvantage 
of the misled.’”); id. at 665, quoting Emery, 71 F.3d at 1348; Reynolds v. E. Dyer 
Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252–53 (7th Cir. 1989). United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 
200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002) (in the course of affirming convictions for wire fraud, 
stated: “when dealing with a claim of fraud based on material omissions, it is 
settled that a duty to disclose ‘arises [only] when one party has information that 
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation 
of trust and confidence between them.’”) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (alterations in original). Nevertheless, Szur held that the 
defendant securities brokers had a duty to disclose their “exorbitant” 45% or 50% 
commissions “even in the absence of any general fiduciary duty resulting from 
discretionary authority.” 289 F.3d at 212; Cf. Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 
231 F.3d 1308, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[C]oncealment of critical data, even 
without a formalized duty to disclose that data, can constitute mail and/or wire 
fraud in certain circumstances . . . . We can envision many situations in which a 
failure to disclose information could constitute [mail/wire] fraud . . . even when 
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no duty to disclose exists independently,” nevertheless, the court found no 
mail/wire fraud duty to disclose under the circumstances of the case); United 
States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898–904 (4th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between 
simple nondisclosure and concealment in federal bank fraud case; finding the de-
fendant guilty of concealment and therefore guilty of bank fraud); United States 
v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating in dictum, “The fraud stat-
utes are violated by affirmative misrepresentations or by omissions of material 
information that the defendant has a duty to disclose.”); United States v. Morris, 
80 F.3d 1151, 1161 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he statutes apply not only to false or 
fraudulent representations, but also to the omission or concealment of material 
information, even where no statute or regulation imposes a duty of disclosure.”); 
United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1984) (where nondisclo-
sure was to third party copyright owners by defendant manufacturer and distrib-
uter of “bootleg” phonograph recordings, court stated “[N]on-disclosure can only 
serve as a basis for a fraudulent scheme when there exists an independent duty 
that has been breached by the person so charged.”; in that case, court held that 
because nondisclosure violated an independent statutory duty, nondisclosure con-
stituted mail fraud); see id. at 1449–50); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 
926 (2d Cir. 1981) (“the concealment by a fiduciary of material information which 
he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the non-dis-
closure could or does result in harm to the other is a violation of the statute”) 
(emphasis added); Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown Holdings, 
Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“An omission cannot give rise to 
a claim of mail or wire fraud liability absent a duty to disclose.”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 151 See United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2012) (not a 
mail/wire fraud case; [T]he concealment by a fiduciary of material information 
which he is under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the 
non-disclosure could or does result in harm to another is a violation of [the fraud 
statutes]’ . . . .Although this rule may not be ‘used in bootstrap fashion by finding 
an obligation to disclose in every breach of fiduciary duty . . . .’”) (quoting mail 
fraud opinion in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981)), over-
ruled on other grounds by McNally v. United States, 484 U.S. 350 (1987); 
Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A defendant’s 
failure to disclose information, without more, cannot make out a violation of the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.”); id. at 10–11 (discussing, without concluding, the 
issue whether “more” requires either (1) a duty to disclose or (2) just withholding 
information with the intent to deceive), discussed in PAUL A. BATISTA, CIVIL 
RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 411E (3d ed. 2015)); United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 
227, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2005) (in affirming mail/wire fraud convictions, stating 
“‘Even in the absence of a fiduciary, statutory, or other independent legal duty to 
disclose material information, common-law fraud includes acts taken to conceal, 
create a false impression, mislead, or otherwise deceive in order to prevent the 
other party from acquiring material information.”) (quoting the federal bank fraud 
case of United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
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One commentator has attempted the following summary of 
when a mail/wire fraud duty to disclose exists: 
                                                                                                             
Cf. United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[N]on-dis-
closure can only serve as a basis for a fraudulent scheme when there exists an 
independent duty that has been breached by the person so charged.”); for addi-
tional discussion, see supra note 150; Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 231 F.3d 
1308, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2000) (vague standard quoted above in note 150). 
For a district court’s application of Langford’s vague standard to grant the defend-
ant’s motion for summary judgment in a civil RICO action based on the predicate 
offenses of mail and wire fraud, see Bradley v. Franklin Collection Serv., No. 
5:10-cv-01537-AKK, 2013 WL 1456714, at *6–7 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2013). For 
a trial court decision applying Langford’s vague standard to dismiss a civil RICO 
action based on the predicate offenses of mail and wire fraud, see Merkle v. Aetna 
Health, Inc., No. 04-61713-CIV, 2006 WL 6151455, at *3–*4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 
2005). For an opinion applying Langford’s vague standard to refuse to dismiss a 
private civil RICO class action based on mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses, 
see In re Managed Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d, 1259, 1277–79 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
Quoting the First Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has stated: 
A defendant’s failure to disclose information, without more, cannot make out a 
violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes. The authorities are less uniform on 
what “more” must be shown to transform a non-actionable nondisclosure into 
fraud in this context. Some courts have required a duty to disclose, triggered by 
an independent statutory scheme, the relationship between the parties, or the de-
fendant’s partial or ambiguous statements that require further disclosure in order 
to avoid being misleading, while others have held that withholding information 
with the intent to deceive is enough. 
United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007)). In Gallant, two 
prospective buyers of bank stock (or their representatives) personally visited two 
defendants and asked them questions about the bank and its operations. See id. at 
1210–19. The defendants did not disclose certain problems. Id. Nor did they dis-
close the fact that they were opening bogus accounts and disguising delinquen-
cies. See id. at 1216–17, 1229. The court held that the two defendants’ “conduct 
went well beyond non-actionable non-disclosure and became ‘deceitful conceal-
ment of material facts,’ thus implicating [the defendants] in the wire fraud 
scheme.” Id. at 1229 (quoting United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 665 (10th 
Cir. 1997)). 
In United States v. Brennan, one government allegation was that the defendant 
violated the mail fraud statute in part because of nondisclosure of conflict of in-
terest. See 183 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1999). Whether the defendant had a duty to 
disclose under the mail fraud statute depended in part on whether the defendant 
had a fiduciary duty to the alleged victims. See id. at 141, 149–50. The Second 
Circuit questioned the accuracy of the trial court’s jury instruction attempting to 
define the nature of fiduciary duties. See id. at 150–51. 
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[M]ost courts recognize that in appropriate circum-
stances, a duty to disclose [under mail/wire fraud] 
may be inferred from the relationship between the 
parties. In jurisdictions that allow a less formal rela-
tionship to give rise to a duty, the determination as to 
whether the duty exists is made on a case by case ba-
sis, taking into account both the nature of the trans-
action and the relationship between the parties.152 
The 1940 Second Circuit decision of United States v. Buckner153 
affirmed certain mail fraud and mail fraud conspiracy convictions 
of defendants who participated in a scheme to profit from purchas-
ing bonds based on nonpublic information.154 The two principal de-
fendants were members of a bondholder’s protective committee.155 
The court held that use of a position on the committee “to obtain 
secret profits based upon inside information . . . [was] an active 
[mail] fraud on the bondholders.”156 This language is not clear 
whether “the bondholders” were mail fraud victims in their capacity 
as indirect employers of the defendants or as prospective sellers to 
the conspirators. 
Nevertheless, the court noted: “[U]nlike the ordinary protective 
committee, which purports to represent only those holders who have 
made a deposit of their bonds, this committee asked for no deposit, 
but assumed to represent the bondholders generally and the commit-
tee reported to them generally . . . .”157 This emphasis on a duty to 
all bondholders suggests that the court may have viewed the victims 
of the prospective insider trade as the bondholders who would sell 
to the insider trader. Were the victim the employer (in this case, the 
                                                                                                             
 152 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8.42, text accompanying nn.516.06 & 516.07 
(footnotes omitted). For an additional brief discussion of when a duty to disclose 
exists, see ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:4 
 153 108 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 154 See id. at 924–27, 930. 
 155 See id. at 923. 
 156 Id. at 926. 
 157 Id. at 927. 
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committee and, indirectly, the bondholders represented by the com-
mittee), it would make no difference whether the committee repre-
sented some or all of the bondholders.158 
A similarity exists between the Buckner defendants and corpo-
rate “insiders.” The Buckner defendants worked for a protective 
committee that represented all the holders of a bond issue.159 Cor-
porate “insiders,” such as directors, officers, independent contrac-
tors, and even lower-level employees, work for an issuing corpora-
tion for the benefit of all the shareholders. By analogy to Exchange 
Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, such corporate insiders may 
have a mail/wire fraud “special” or “classical” relationship with the 
shareholders.160 Insiders who buy shares based on material nonpub-
lic information may commit mail and wire fraud by breaching a fi-
duciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to disclose to the shareholder in con-
tractual privity.161 An insider who sells shares to someone not yet a 
shareholder might still owe a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty to 
                                                                                                             
 158 For discussion of whether a creditor committee member has a Rule 10b-5 
“classical relationship” with any represented creditor, see WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, § 5.2.6[C] nn.375–76 and accompanying text. For discussion of the 
more general issue of whether a corporate insider who trades the company’s debt 
instruments has a Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” with the party on the other 
side, see id. § 5.2.6[C]. For related discussion, see supra note 140 and accompa-
nying text. 
 159 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 160 For a discussion of the “classical relationship” under Section 10(b)/Rule 
10b-5 between employees/independent contractors of an issuer and the sharehold-
ers, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.3[A], 5.2.3[B]. 
 161 Cf. United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2002) (in the 
course of affirming convictions for wire fraud, stating: “when dealing with a claim 
of fraud based on material omissions, it is settled that a duty to disclose ‘arises 
[only] when one party has information that the other [party] is entitled to know 
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.’” (quoting Rule 10b-5 classical relationship language of Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)) (alterations in original)) Nevertheless, Szur held 
that the defendant securities brokers had a duty to disclose their “exorbitant” 45% 
or 50% commissions “even in the absence of any general fiduciary duty resulting 
from discretionary authority.” Szur, 289 F.3d at 212; United States v. DeCastris, 
798 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Concealing information known to be pertinent 
to a proper decision may be a fraudulent scheme [under mail fraud].”). 
For discussion of the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” duty to the 
party on the other side of the trade, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1 
(discussing the “classical relationship” triangle). 
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disclose to that prospective shareholder who becomes one simulta-
neous with the trade.162 
Under the “special” or “classical” relationship mail/wire fraud 
approach, the government should be able to prosecute for mail and 
wire fraud even if the party in contractual privity with an insider 
trader cannot be identified after the fact.163 The defendant must have 
traded with someone; therefore a victim exists. Even if the party in 
privity would have traded anyway,164 she can still be a victim of mail 
and wire fraud: the party in privity is a victim of the nondisclosure, 
not of the trade.165 
                                                                                                             
 162 For the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 analogy, see Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1 n.49 
and accompanying text. 
 163 Identifying the party in privity after the fact is sometimes possible and 
sometimes not. See id. § 6.7 nn.485–96 and accompanying text. For related dis-
cussion, see infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010), held: “We have pre-
viously determined, however, that this type of `fraud [mail and wire fraud] does 
not include an element requiring a contemplated harm to a specific, identifiable 
victim.’” (quoting United States v. Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 
2004)). 
Also quoting Henningsen, United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1369 (11th 
Cir. 2005), held: “‘The crime of mail fraud does not include an element requiring 
a contemplated harm to a specific, identifiable victim.’” 
 164 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 3.3.3. 
 165 For discussion of the distinction between trade victims and nondisclosure 
victims, see id. § 3.2; William K.S. Wang, The Importance of “The Law of Con-
servation of Securities”: A Reply to John P. Anderson’s “What’s the Harm in 
Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?,” 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 812-13, 824 
(2015). For extended discussion of trade victims, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 3.3. For extended discussion of nondisclosure victims, see id. § 3.4, es-
pecially § 3.4.3[A]. 
Even were one to focus unnecessarily on the party on the other side as a trade 
victim (as opposed to a nondisclosure victim), at least one circuit court has stated 
that pecuniary loss to the victim is not necessary as long as pecuniary gain to the 
defendant is present. See United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1472–73 (9th 
Cir. 1993). See also United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(defendant acts with the intent to defraud when he “acts knowingly with the spe-
cific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary ‘loss to another or 
bringing about some financial gain to himself.’”) (quoting United States v. 
Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 732 (5th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). Cf. United States 
v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[W]e have been cited to no case, 
and our research has discovered none, which has sustained a conviction for mail 
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United States v. Ruggiero166 involved two insider trading de-
fendants convicted of wire fraud and of securities fraud under SEC 
Rules 10b-5167 and 14e-3.168 One defendant was a senior auditor em-
ployed at Vista Chemical Company.169 Allegedly, this defendant 
gave a friend (the other defendant) material nonpublic information 
about a takeover of Vista.170 Both defendants profited by buying 
Vista call options prior to the takeover announcement.171 
Applying a traditional Chiarella/Dirks analysis,172 the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected the tippee’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
and affirmed his securities fraud convictions under the “classical re-
lationship” theory under Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 
10b-5.173 In only two sentences at the end of the opinion, the court 
                                                                                                             
fraud on the basis of nothing more than the failure to mail a correct proxy solici-
tation where this was not in furtherance of some larger scheme contemplating 
pecuniary loss to someone or pecuniary gain to those who designed it.”) (empha-
sis added). But cf. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1996) (“the 
government must show that some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the 
schemer”) (quoting United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 
1994)); United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 1995) (“‘[t]he gov-
ernment must prove a specific intent to defraud, which requires a showing that the 
defendant intended for some harm to result from his deceit.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Loney, 959 F.3d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
Another circuit case suggested that an intended victim may not be essential when 
it approved a jury instruction stating “that intent to defraud could be found if the 
defendants acted ‘knowingly with the specific intent to deceive ordinarily for the 
purpose of causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some finan-
cial gain to oneself.’” United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1414 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(quoting district court’s jury instruction on the mail and wire fraud charges) (al-
terations in original). 
For discussion of the judicial division over whether the mail/wire fraud statutes 
require a scheme that contemplates a loss to the victim, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, 
& BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.8. For general discussion of the requisite intent to 
defraud, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 166 56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 167 See id. at 649, 653–55. For discussion of the application of SEC Rule 10b-
5 to insider trading defendants, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, chs. 4, 5. 
 168 See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 649, 655. For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, ch. 9. 
 169 See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 649. 
 170 See id. at 649–51, 654–56. 
 171 See id. at 650. 
 172 See id. at 654–55. For discussion of the Chiarella and Dirks Supreme Court 
decisions, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2, 5.3. 
 173 See Ruggiero, 56 F.3d at 653–56. 
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affirmed the same defendant’s wire fraud convictions: “As noted 
above, we reject . . . the contention that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the securities law convictions. Accordingly, we 
find that there was sufficient evidence that . . . [the defendant] used 
the wires in furtherance of the fraud, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343.”174 Apparently, the Fifth Circuit imported the Rule 10b-5 
classical relationship theory to wire fraud. Such a theory involves 
fraud on the party on the other side of the insider trade.175 
Uncertain is whether, for stock market insider traders, the re-
quired mail/wire fraud relationship is narrower, broader, or the same 
as the necessary Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship.” Thus far, virtu-
ally no courts have explored the insider trader’s mail/wire fraud duty 
to disclose to the party on the other side of the trade. 
3. CAN AN INSIDER TRADER HAVE TWO MAIL/WIRE FRAUD 
VICTIMS: THE ISSUER/INFORMATION-OWNER AND THE PARTY 
ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TRANSACTION? 
Suppose an employee of a public company trades its shares 
based on material nonpublic information. Does the insider trade 
have two mail/wire fraud victims: the issuer/information-owner and 
the party on the other side of the transaction? 
Because the Carpenter defendants committed mail/wire fraud 
by misappropriating the Wall Street Journal’s confidential informa-
tional property176 and because O’Hagan perpetrated mail fraud by 
misappropriating informational property from his law firm and its 
client,177 the hypothetical corporate employee might misappropriate 
her employer’s confidential informational property. As discussed 
above, another mail/wire fraud victim of the employee might be the 
                                                                                                             
 174 Id. at 656. 
 175 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.1. 
 176 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For discussion of Car-
penter, see supra notes 63–83 and accompanying text. 
 177 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678–79, 700–01 (1997) (ap-
plying Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19); United States v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 651–53 
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19). For discussion of both the Su-
preme Court and Eighth Circuit (on remand) O’Hagan opinions, see supra notes 
84–97 and accompanying text. 
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party on the other side of the trade.178 The courts have not consid-
ered whether the same conduct could have two separate mail/wire 
fraud victims under two different theories.179 
4. MATERIALITY 
In Neder v. United States,180 the Supreme Court imposed a ma-
teriality requirement for mail/wire fraud.181 Neder said “a false state-
ment is material if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] ca-
pable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to 
which it was addressed.’”182 Additionally, while discussing the de-
fendant’s argument that Congress implicitly incorporated the com-
mon law definition of materiality into the mail/wire fraud statutes, 
the Court included a footnote quoting the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts’ definition of a material matter: 
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its 
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice 
of action in the transaction in question; or (b) the 
maker of the representation knows or has reason to 
know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard 
the matter as important in determining his choice of 
                                                                                                             
 178 See supra Part II(B)(2). 
 179 For discussion of the related question whether an employee trading her 
company’s stock based on material nonpublic information can violate both the 
SEC Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine and the “classical relationship” theory, 
see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.11. 
Were such Rule 10b-5 overlap permitted, and were the tests for tipper/tippee lia-
bility laxer for Rule 10b-5 misappropriation than for the Rule 10b-5 “classical 
relationship,” prosecutors, the SEC, and private plaintiffs might prefer pursuing 
tippers and tippees under misappropriation rather than the “classical relationship.” 
For discussion of the Rule 10b-5 liability of tippers and tippees under both theo-
ries, see infra Part II(B)(5); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.3, 5.4.4–
5.4.10. The Supreme Court has not addressed tipper and tippee liability under the 
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine. 
 180 527 U.S. 1 (1999). 
 181 See id. at 20–25; id. at 25 (“materiality of falsehood is an element of the 
federal mail fraud, wire fraud . . . statutes”). For discussion of Neder, see 2 
BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:48; Cloud & Shepherd, supra note 56, at 948. 
 182 Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 
(1995)). 
Generally, a jury decides the question of materiality. See United States v. Harms, 
442 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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action, although a reasonable man would not so re-
gard it.183 
Restatement Section 538(2)(a) goes beyond the “reasonable per-
son” standard.184 Nevertheless, some circuits may endorse the “rea-
sonable person” or “person of ordinary prudence” definition: 
mail/wire fraud is material only if a “reasonable person” would at-
tach importance to the misstatement or nondisclosure.185 Other cir-
                                                                                                             
 183 Neder, 527 U.S. at 22 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 538 (AM . LAW INST. 1977)). 
 184 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538, clause 2, (a) cmt. includes the 
following statement: 
Even though the matter misrepresented is one to which a rea-
sonable man would not attach any importance in determining 
his course of action in the transaction in hand, it is nevertheless 
material if the maker knows that the recipient, because of his 
own peculiarities, is likely to attach importance to it. There are 
many persons whose judgment, even in important transactions, 
is likely to be determined by considerations that the normal man 
would regard as altogether trivial or even ridiculous. One who 
practices upon another’s known idiosyncracies cannot com-
plain if he is held liable when he is successful in what he is 
endeavoring to accomplish. 
See also Cloud & Shepherd, supra note 56, at 948 “([A] lie not capable of mis-
leading a reasonable person is still material if a victim is so gullible, guileless, or 
incompetent that he actually believes it.”). 
 185 See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2005). 
Accord 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, § 8:58 n.729.115–729.120 and accompanying 
text; 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 14, § 17.7(B), at 13–15; Lauren D. 
Lunsford, Note, Fraud, Fools, and Phishing: Mail Fraud and the Person of Or-
dinary Prudence in the Internet Age, 99 KY. L.J. 379, 389–91 (2010-2011). Cf. 
Linden v. United States, 254 F.2d 560, 566 (4th Cir. 1958) (while affirming con-
victions, quoting district court’s holding that “the defendants had engaged in ‘a 
scheme reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and com-
prehension.’”); United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.2d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 1998) (pre-
Neder; affirming convictions; in passing, saying scheme must be “‘reasonably 
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.’”) (quot-
ing United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1985)). But cf. United 
States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1168 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[The defend-
ants] cite decisions that use the ‘ordinary prudence’ language as evidence that 
fraud requires a scheme capable of defrauding the reasonably prudent, but none 
of the decisions cited by [the defendants] . . . overturned a conviction on the 
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cuits have abandoned the “reasonable person” standard of material-
ity in favor of the broader formulation: capable of influencing the 
intended victim. 
In United States v. Brown, the Eleventh Circuit held: “mail fraud 
requires the government to prove that a reasonable person would 
have acted on the representations.”186 In 2009, however, in United 
States v. Svete,187 the Eleventh Circuit en banc overruled Brown188 
and held: 
[P]roof of objective reliability is not necessary to es-
tablish materiality if the defendant knows or should 
know that the victim is likely to regard the misrepre-
sented facts as important . . . . [A] defendant who in-
tends to deceive the ignorant or gullible by preying 
on their infirmities is no less guilty.189 
Citing other circuits that rejected Brown, Syete noted: “Brown 
still stands alone. It has been rejected by other circuits. It has been 
distinguished on debatable grounds within our Circuit. It has been 
criticized in legal scholarship.”190 
                                                                                                             
ground that the scheme was incapable of deceiving persons of ordinary pru-
dence.”); United States v. Heppner, 519 F.3d 744, 749 (8th Cir. 2008) (“‘if it has 
a natural tendency to influence or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the 
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’”) (quoting Preston v. United 
States, 312 F.3d 959, 961 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original); United 
States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. 
at 16) (“material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influ-
encing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.”); 
United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A misrepresentation 
is material if it is capable of influencing the intended victim.” (citing Neder, 527 
U.S. at 24)); Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire 
Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 807 (1999) (“The circuits that use the objective [reasonable 
person] standard usually invoke it while affirming the lower courts’ convictions); 
id. at 807–08 (concluding that Linden v. United States in fact “extended the stat-
ute’s protection, which it saw as purposely broad, beyond the ordinarily prudent 
person in order to reach those victims who were less than ordinarily prudent. 
 186 79 F.2d 1550. 1557 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 187 556 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 188 See id. at 1166–70. 
 189 Id. at 1165. 
 190 Id. at 1167. For discussion of Svete, see 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, §§ 8:32, 
8:58. 
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Likewise, in the Seventh Circuit decision, United States v. Coff-
man, Chief Justice Posner rejected Brown in ringing terms in inter-
preting the materiality requirement for mail/wire fraud: 
But it is hard to believe that this language is intended 
to be understood literally, for if it were it would in-
vite con men to prey on people of below-average 
judgment or intelligence, who are anyway the big-
gest targets of such criminals and hence the people 
most needful of the law’s protection-and most need-
ful or not are within its protective scope.191 
                                                                                                             
 191 Id. at 334. 
For an example of another circuit that rejected Brown, see United States v. Amico, 
486 F.3d 764, 780 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The majority of circuits to address the issue 
have rejected [Brown].”). Earlier, the Second Circuit had decided United States v. 
Thomas, 377 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2004), a case involving not mail/wire fraud but 
inducement of travel in interstate commerce for a fraudulent purpose in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Thomas noted: “Most circuits . . . have already rejected some 
form of the `unreasonable victim’ [defense] argument.” Id. at 243. In Amico, 486 
F.3d at 780, the Second Circuit extended its Thomas reasoning to mail fraud. 
For other decisions rejecting the “reasonable person” standard, see United States 
v. Hanley, 190 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Lemon v. United States, 
278 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1960)); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of 
Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 
299 (1st Cir. 1980)) (defendant does not escape liability if victim was unwary or 
even gullible; citing Brien); Brien, 617 F.2d at 311 (“[I]t makes no difference 
whether the persons the schemers intended to defraud are gullible or skeptical, 
dull or bright.”). See ANDROPHY, supra note 13, § 8:7; 2 BRICKEY, supra note 11, 
§ 8:48 n.870.200 and accompanying text (“a statement may be material whether 
or not anyone relies on it or even if the recipient knew of should have known it 
was false”); id. § 8:58 n.726. See also id. § 8:58 n.729.130 and accompanying 
text. 
The court in United States v. Masten said that while the reasonable person stand-
ard might be useful in deciding whether the defendant had intent to defraud (e.g., 
when the defendant claims she was joking), once the defendant has the requisite 
intent, and dupes the victim, it makes no difference whether the victim was “rea-
sonable.” 170 F.3d 790, 795–96 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]s we explained in Coffman, 
the mail fraud statute also protects unreasonable persons.”). 
As just mentioned (see supra text at note 183), Neder said that one possible defi-
nition of materiality was: “a false statement is material if it has ‘a natural tendency 
to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking 
body to which it was addressed.’” 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)) (emphasis added). For cases adopting similar 
definitions of materiality, see United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 
280 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:220 
In those circuits that have adopted the “capable of influencing 
the intended victim” test, the materiality definition for mail/wire 
fraud is laxer than the “reasonable person” materiality standard for 
SEC Rule 10b-5.192 
                                                                                                             
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 
2003)) (“if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing 
the decision maker to whom it is addressed.’”); United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 
882, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing inquiry as “‘[w]hether the statement has a 
natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the addressee’s deci-
sion.’”) (quoting United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2004)); 
United States v. Jackson, 546 F.3d 801, 815 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Neder, 527 
U.S. at 16); United States v. Heppner, 519 F.3d 744, 749 (8th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 339 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing materiality as 
“[having] a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-
sion of the decision-making body to which it was addressed.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2006)); United States v. Rosby, 454 
F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A representation is material if it has a tendency to 
influence the decision of the audience to which it is addressed.”) (citing Neder, 
527 U.S. at 22–23); United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 899 (10th Cir. 2005) (approving a jury 
instruction that a statement is material if “‘it has a natural tendency to influence, 
or is capable of influencing a decision or action by another.’”); United States v. 
Henningsen, 387 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A false statement is material if 
it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision 
of the decisionmaking body to which it is addressed.’”) (quoting United States v. 
Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 
1174, 1182–83, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004) (“whether the statement has a natural ten-
dency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the addressee’s decision”) (citing 
United States v. LeVeque, 283 F.3d 1098, 1103–1104 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
For discussion of the split among the circuits and an argument against the “person 
of ordinary prudence” standard, see Lunsford, supra note 186. For additional dis-
cussion of the split among the circuits, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra 
note 15, § 17.7(B); Zingale, supra note 186. Cf. Doyle Chapter, supra note 13, at 
4 (discussing the issue “whether the statutes reach schemes designed to deceive 
the gullible though they would not ensnare the reasonably prudent.”). 
 192  For discussion of the materiality standard for SEC Rule 10b-5, see Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (“‘[a]n omitted fact is material if there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder [investor] would consider 
it important in deciding how to vote [whether to buy or sell].’”) (quoting TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 462 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); id. at 231–32 (“‘there 
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total 
mix’ of information made available.’”) (quoting TSC Industries, 462 U.S. at 449); 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.2. 
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A stock market trader may or may not know the identity of the 
party on the other side. The line between face-to-face stock trades 
and stock market transactions is blurry. Especially with large blocks, 
such trading often involves conversations between buyer and 
seller.193 
When the insider trader does not know the identity of the person 
on the opposite side, however, it may be difficult to apply the mate-
riality standard: “capable of influencing, the decision of the deci-
sionmaking body to which it was addressed.”194 With an anonymous 
transaction, the courts might conceivably adapt this definition, with 
a result potentially different from the Rule 10b-5 standard.195 For 
example, one possible mail/wire fraud adaptation would be: capable 
of influencing the decision of the typical investor or, alternatively, a 
reasonable investor. 
When the victim is the information-owner, mail/wire fraud ma-
teriality may have a different meaning than when the victim is the 
party on the other side of a transaction.196 
                                                                                                             
With respect to “materiality,” one commentator has said: “There is no assurance 
that the mail fraud statute will be applied in a fashion consistent with Rule 10b-5. 
Mail fraud does not traditionally deal with materiality concepts, nor, of course, 
did Carpenter include a materiality test.” Dreeben, supra note 83, at 213. For 
discussion of two mail/wire fraud cases, United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d 
Cir. 1985) and United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983), in which the 
materiality definition was much broader than that under the federal securities 
laws, see Dreeben, supra note 83, at 189–91.}} 
 
 193 See Dan Stumpf, Markets Keeping Faith in Humanity, WALL ST. J., July 
29, 2014, at C1 (“Last year, about 55% of stock trading by dollar volume took 
place in a ‘high-touch’ fashion, among human beings communicating one on one 
and agreeing on the price.”). 
For discussion of the blurred distinction between block trades and face-to-face 
trading, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 3.3.1, 8.2.2, 15.2.1; William 
K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies–In-
cluding an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45 
VILLANOVA L. REV. 27, 30–31 (2000). 
 194 Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 509 
(1995)). For additional discussion, see supra notes 183–85, 187–94 and accom-
panying text. 
 195 For discussion of the definition of “materiality” under Rule 10b-5, see su-
pra note 192. 
 196 For a discussion of the definition of “materiality” under the Rule 10b-5 
“misappropriation” doctrine of insider trading liability, see WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, § 4.2.1. 
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In Rule 10b-5 misappropriation cases, the courts have generally 
defined materiality in terms of a reasonable investor’s decision to 
purchase or sell.197 Arguably, however, the relevant standard of ma-
teriality in such cases should be the importance of the information 
to the information-source.198 Similarly, in mail/wire fraud insider 
trading cases based on the deprivation of confidential informational 
property, arguably the relevant standard of materiality should be the 
importance to the property owner.199 
In its mail/wire fraud informational property decision, Carpen-
ter, the Supreme Court did not mention materiality.200 Likewise, 
while addressing insider trading in O’Hagan,201 the Supreme Court 
did not discuss materiality either for Rule 10b-5 or mail fraud.202 
Outside the insider trading context, prior to Skilling,203 the Sec-
ond Circuit en banc adopted the following test for finding a depri-
vation of “the intangible right to honest services”: “the misrepresen-
tation or omission at issue for an ‘honest services’ fraud conviction 
must be ‘material,’ such that the misinformation or omission would 
                                                                                                             
 197 See id. § 4.2.1 n.44 and accompanying text. 
 198 See id. § 4.2.1 nn.39–42, 45 and accompanying text. 
 199 Cf. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981) (an insider 
trading case quoting United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 
1980) (“an employee’s breach of his fiduciary obligations is actionable under the 
[mail fraud] statute when it encompasses the violation of a ‘duty to disclose ma-
terial information to his employer.’”) (emphasis added)). 
 200 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For discussion of Car-
penter, see supra Part II(B)(1). 
 201 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 202 See id. For discussion of O’Hagan, see supra notes 60–62, 84–96 and ac-
companying text. 
On remand, the court in United States v. O’Hagan discussed materiality in the 
Rule 10b-5 part of the opinion, but not in its mail fraud portion. See 139 F.3d 641, 
648, 651–53 (8th Cir. 1998). For additional discussion of this decision, see supra 
note 97 and accompanying text; infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
In United States v. Cherif, a mail/wire fraud stock market insider trading case, the 
court held that the defendant had waived his argument that the trial court had 
failed to instruct the jury that the information he obtained or sought to obtain was 
“material.” See 943 F.2d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 203 The court in Skilling v. United States held that the “intangible right to hon-
est services” applies only to bribery and kickback schemes. See 561 U.S. 358 
(2010). For discussion of mail/wire fraud’s application to the deprivation of “the 
intangible right to honest services,” see supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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naturally tend to lead or is capable of leading a reasonable employer 
to change its conduct.”204 
In United States v. Elliott,205 the defendant was an attorney who 
allegedly engaged in wire fraud by insider trading on confidential 
client information thereby depriving his law firm and its clients of 
confidential informational property.206 The government conceded 
                                                                                                             
 204 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (em-
phasis added). Rybicki discussed the then judicial split (pre-Skilling) over the 
proper test for mail/wire fraud liability for “honest services fraud”: “reasonable 
foreseeable harm” to the employer or “materiality” to the employer. See id. at 
145–46. 
For additional discussion of this pre-Skilling split, see United States v. Vinyard, 
266 F.3d 320, 327–28 (4th Cir. 2001); 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 
15, § 17.19(B); Anita Cava & Brian M. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo Corruption Is “So 
Yesterday”: Restoring Honest Services Fraud After Skilling and Black, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2011); Andrew B. Matheson, A Critique of United States 
v. Rybicki: Why Foreseeable Harm Should Be an Aspect of the Mens Rea of Hon-
est Services Fraud, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 355, 370–86 (2004–05); Lisa Kern 
Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 
1842–43 (2011). For an example of a pre-Skilling Second Circuit “honest ser-
vices” wire fraud opinion following Rybicki’s definition of materiality, see United 
States v. Gotti, 459 F.2d 296, 330 (2d Cir. 2006). For a pre-Skilling district court 
“honest services” case quoting Rybicki’s definition, see World Wrestling Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Jakke Pac., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 486, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
For another example of a pre-Skilling “honest services” case adopting the “mate-
riality to employer” test, see United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 
1981) (materiality exists whenever an employee “has reason to believe that the 
information would lead a reasonable employer to change its business conduct.”) 
(emphasis added). See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(citing Ballard, 663 F.2d at 541); United States v. Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 774–75 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (citing and quoting Ballard, 663 F.2d 534); United States v. Lemire, 
720 F.2d 1327, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Ballard, 663 F.2d at 541); United 
States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 1983) (“only if the nondisclosed 
information was material to the conduct of the employer’s business”; honest ser-
vices case”) (citing Ballard, 663 F.2d 534). For discussion of Feldman, see Brad-
ley, supra note 83, at 597–99. 
For pre-Skilling discussion of the materiality to employer requirement in “honest 
services” cases, see 2 WELLING, BEALE, & BUCY, supra note 15, § 17.19(A)(ii). 
For a post-Skilling circuit court decision adopting the “materiality to employer 
test” in a bribery-based “deprivation of honest services” scheme, see United States 
v. Milovanovic, 678 F.3d 713, 716, 726–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Gray, 96 F.3d 
769; Rybyicki, 354 F.3d 124; and other circuit court cases). 
 205 711 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 206 See id. at 426–29. For additional discussion of Elliott, see supra notes 101–
03 and accompanying text. 
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that the “‘nonpublic information must have been of some im-
portance to both Elliott and the victims of the fraud to constitute 
property.’”207 The fraud victims were the law firm and its clients.208 
Nevertheless, the court in Elliott held that the indictment suffi-
ciently alleged that the confidential client information was material 
because the indictment stated that the defendant: 
bought stock in companies he knew were targeted for 
acquisition, in the expectation that the price of the 
stock would rise when the acquisition became public. 
If the price of the stock was expected to rise when 
information about the acquisition became public, that 
information must have had some significance or, to 
use Elliott’s word, must have been “material.209 
Just because the defendant expected the information to cause a 
stock price increase when released does not necessarily mean that 
the information was material to the law firm or its clients.210 
Ironically, in its discussion of materiality under the Rule 10b-5 
misappropriation doctrine, Elliott held that the proper definition was 
the importance to the employer/information-source and not outside 
investors: 
In a misappropriation case, however, where the focus 
is on the insider’s duty to the corporation, it would 
be incongruous to have a materiality standard based 
on the outsider’s point of view. Rather, we believe it 
is enough if the misappropriated information is 
“solely for corporate purposes,” Dirks, 464 U.S. at 
                                                                                                             
 207 Elliot, 711 F. Supp. at 430 (quoting Government’s Response at 9) (empha-
sis added). 
 208 See id. at 426–29. 
 209 Id. at 430. 
 210 Nevertheless, an insider trading case that apparently treated Rule 10b-5 and 
mail fraud materiality as equivalent is United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., L.P., 
785 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
Similarly, in the course of refusing to dismiss an indictment for insider trading in 
violation of both Rule 10b-5 and wire fraud, a trial court applied Levinson and the 
Rule 10b-5 materiality definition in its three-paragraph discussion of materiality 
under both Rule 10b-5 and wire fraud. See United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 
162, 169 (W.D. Va. 1993). 
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655 . . . and if a reasonable corporate executive 
would believe keeping that information confidential 
was valuable to the corporation.211 
In any event, for mail/wire fraud liability for stock market in-
sider trading, materiality may have a standard that is: 
(1) laxer (beyond “reasonable person”) or 
(2) in cases involving deprivation of informational 
property, different (importance to the owner of the 
information as opposed to a stock market investor). 
5. “PERSONAL BENEFIT” TEST FOR TIPPER LIABILITY AND 
“KNOW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF INITIAL TIPPER’S 
BREACH” TEST FOR TIPPEE LIABILITY 
Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory and proba-
bly the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, the initial tipper must 
receive a “personal benefit.”212 Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical re-
lationship” theory and probably the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation 
doctrine, each direct and remote tippee must “know or should know” 
of the initial tipper’s violation.213 With Rule 10b-5 misappropria-
tion, however, the Supreme Court has not addressed the standard for 
tipper and tippee liability. 
                                                                                                             
 211 711 F. Supp. at 433. 
 212 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2014) , cert. 
denied, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., Oct. 5, 2015); id. at 446 (“The elements of tip-
ping liability are the same regardless of whether the tipper’s duty arises under the 
“classical” or the “misappropriation” theory.”) (citing SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 
285–86 (2d Cir. 2012)); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274–80 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(applying “personal benefit” test to misappropriating tipper); WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.2.8, 5.4.4. For the Supreme Court’s “personal ben-
efit” test for tipper liability in a Rule 10b-5 classical relationship case, see Dirks 
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662–64 (1963); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.2.8. 
For application of the Dirks test for tipper liability, see Newman, 773 F.3d at 446, 
451–53 (discussed infra at notes 222–230 and accompanying text). 
 213 See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287–89 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating misappro-
priator’s tippee must “know or should know” of the initial tipper’s violation); 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 5.3.2, 5.4.5. For the Supreme Court’s 
standard for tippee liability in a Rule 10b-5 classical relationship case, see Dirks, 
463 U.S. at 660. For application of the Dirks test for tippee liability, see Newman, 
773 F.3d at 446-50 (discussed infra at notes 227–35 and accompanying text. 
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A recent Rule 10b-5 Second Circuit decision makes it more dif-
ficult for the prosecution to demonstrate the “personal benefit” and 
“know or should know” elements.214 As to the requirement that the 
tippee “know or should know” of the initial tipper’s violation, the 
Second Circuit held that means that the tippee must know that the 
initial tipper received the requisite “personal benefit.”215 The court 
noted that, to its knowledge, five district judges confronting the is-
sue imposed that requirement, and only one district judge (the court 
below) refused to do so.216 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s hold-
ing makes it more difficult to find remote tippees liable under Rule 
10b-5. 
As to the initial tippers’ “personal benefit,” the court said: 
The circumstantial evidence in this case was simply 
too thin to warrant the inference that the corporate 
insiders received any personal benefit in exchange 
for their tips. As to the Dell tips, the Government es-
tablished that Goyal and Ray were not “close” 
friends, but had known each other for years, having 
both attended business school and worked at Dell to-
gether. Further, Ray, who wanted to become a Wall 
Street analyst like Goyal, sought career advice and 
assistance from Goyal. The evidence further showed 
that Goyal advised Ray on a range of topics, from 
discussing the qualifying examination in order to be-
come a financial analyst to editing Ray’s résumé and 
sending it to a Wall Street recruiter, and that some of 
this assistance began before Ray began to provide 
tips about Dell’s earnings. The evidence also estab-
lished that Lim and Choi were “family friends” that 
had met through church and occasionally socialized 
together. The Government argues that these facts 
were sufficient to prove that the tippers derived some 
                                                                                                             
For discussion of a possible special Rule 10b-5 insider trading solicitude for ana-
lysts, see supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 214 See Newman, 773 F.3d at 451–55, cert. denied, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., 
Oct. 5, 2015). In Newman, the government did not charge the defendants with 
mail/wire fraud. See id. at 442–43. 
 215 See id. at 442, 447–50. 
 216 See id. at 449–50. 
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benefit from the tip. We disagree. If this was a “ben-
efit,” practically anything would qualify. . . . . 
[T]he Government may [not] prove the receipt of a 
personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, par-
ticularly of a casual or social nature . . . . To the ex-
tent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be in-
ferred from a personal relationship between the tip-
per and tippee, where the tippee’s trades “resemble 
trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of 
the profits to the recipient,” see 463 U.S. at 664, . . . 
we hold that such an inference is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal re-
lationship that generates an exchange that is objec-
tive, consequential, and represents at least a poten-
tial gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. 
In other words, as Judge Walker noted in Jiau, this 
requires evidence of “a relationship between the in-
sider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo 
from the latter, or an intention to benefit the [lat-
ter].”217 
                                                                                                             
 217 Id. at 451–52 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 
2013)) (emphasis added). 
For a discussion of Newman, see Jodi L Avergun & Douglas H. Fischer, Friends 
With Benefits: Second Circuit Overturns Newman and Chiasson Convictions and 
Raises the Government’s Burden in Insider Trading Cases Against Tippees, (Dec. 
12, 2014), http://bna.com/friends-benefits-second-n17179918853; Robert Hoff, 
Richard Levan, & Ivana Greco, The Gift of ‘Newman’: Not All Tippers Benefit 
from Sharing Confidential Information, (N.Y.L.J. Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202717100248/The-Gift-of-Newman; 
Gregory Morvillo & Eugene Ingoglia, Impact of ‘Newman’ in Other Insider Trad-
ing Cases, (N.Y.L.J. Feb. 5, 2015) www.newyorklawjour-
nal.com/id=1202717054038/Impact-of-Newma-in-Other-Insider-Trading-
Cases?slreturn=20150631103413; Subcommittee on Annual Review, Committee 
on Federal Regulation of Securities, ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Re-
view of Federal Securities Regulation, 70 BUS. LAW. 923–26 (2014–2015); 
Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading (Ind. Le-
gal Res. Paper No. 327, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2665820; Adam C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Bene-
fit, 69 SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015); Strader, supra note 21. 
For a description of the decision by federal prosecutors to drop charges against 
five insider trading defendants in light of Newman, see Christopher M. Matthews, 
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Dirks emphasizes that the tipper’s “personal benefit” may be di-
rect or indirect and gives the following examples: (1) pecuniary 
gain, (2) an enhancement of reputation that will translate into future 
                                                                                                             
Insider Charges Are Being Dropped, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2015, at C3, col. 1. For 
a description of a federal district court decision to allow four of these insider trad-
ing defendants to withdraw guilty pleas in light of Newman, see Christopher M. 
Matthews, Insider-Trading Defendants Allowed to Retract Guilty Pleas, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 23, 2015, at C3, col. 1. For a decision partially relying on Newman to 
grant summary judgment against the plaintiff in a private civil complaint against 
an alleged insider trader, see Gordon v. Sonar Capital Mgmt., 2015 WL 4554194 
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2015). For a description of Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet 
Bharara’s decision to seek dismissal of charges against seven insider trading de-
fendants, see Christopher M. Matthews & Aruna Viswanatha, Prosecutor Pulls 
Plug on Insider Charges, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 2015, at 1. See generally, Christo-
pher M. Matthews, Prosecutors’ Unlikely Ally: Judge: Rakoff’s rulings question 
appellate court’s decision on insider trading cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2015, 
at C3. 
In Newman, the United States filed a brief petitioning for a rehearing or rehearing 
en banc. See Petition of the United States of America for Rehearing and Rehearing 
En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837), 
2015 WL 1064423. 
The SEC filed an amicus brief supporting the petition of the United States for 
rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petition of the United States for Re-
hearing or Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 
2014) (No. 13-1837). 
For the opposition briefs of the defendants, see Brief of Defendant-Appellant An-
thony Chiasson in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Re-
hearing and Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 
2014) (No. 13-1837); Brief of Defendant-Appellant Todd Newman in Opposition 
to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, 
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837). 
For some amicus opposition briefs, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors 
Stephen Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and Jonathan Macey in Opposition to 
the United States of America’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837), 2015 WL 1064409; Brief 
for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the New York 
Council of Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae Opposing the Petition of the United 
States for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 
438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837), 2015 WL 1064411); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Mark Cuban in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Rehear-
ing En Banc, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-
1837), 2015 WL 1064412. 
The Second Circuit refused to rehear the case. See United States v. Newman, 2015 
WL 1954058 (Apr. 3, 2015). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. See United 
States v. Newman, 2015 WL 4575840 (U.S., Oct. 5, 2015). 
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earnings, (3) an expectation of reciprocal tips or other items of value, 
and (4) the gift of confidential information to a friend or relative.218 
As to the last example, Dirks states: “The elements of fiduciary 
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative 
or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”219 
This illustration involves a vicarious benefit: feeling better off 
solely because someone else is better off, with no necessary expec-
tation of a quid pro quo. If a parent conveys material nonpublic in-
formation to a child, the parent may feel better off regardless of any 
quid pro quo. The economist, Professor Kenneth E. Boulding, de-
scribed such a vicarious benefit as “benevolence.”220 
One possible reason why the Supreme Court adopted the “per-
sonal benefit” requirement for the initial tipper is that, in certain sit-
uations, some sort of “personal benefit” requirement may be neces-
sary to avoid an unjust result: 
The “personal benefit” test may be necessary to dis-
tinguish between proper and improper tips . . . . Sup-
pose an individual conveys material nonpublic infor-
mation to a friend, who is also the individual’s attor-
ney. Surely, no [violation] . . . occurs if the individual 
conveys the information in the course of obtaining 
legal advice as to whether trading on the information 
would be legal. In contrast, [a violation] . . . might 
occur if the individual is conveying the information 
                                                                                                             
 218 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983). For a discussion of 
demonstrating the tipper’s “personal benefit,” see WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 1, § 5.2.8[C], at 390–93. 
 219 463 U.S. at 664. 
 220 See Kenneth E. Boulding, Economics as a Moral Science, 59 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 6 (1969) (“[I]nterdependence of utility functions. . . .We . . . rejoice when 
they rejoice . . . .”) (presidential address delivered at the Eighty-first meeting of 
the American Economic Association, Chicago, Illinois, December 29, 1968; 
available on internet). 
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with the intent that the attorney sell his/her holdings 
based on the information.221 
Alternatively, a patient may disclose material nonpublic infor-
mation to her psychiatrist without expecting that the psychiatrist 
would trade on the information. Criminal liability for the patient 
seems improper.222 In addition, a whistleblower might disclose in-
formation to an investigative journalist or investigative stock analyst 
without anticipating that the journalist or analyst would trade or tip 
others who trade.223 In this way, the “personal benefit” requirement 
protects innocent individuals. 
If the reason for the “personal benefit” requirement is to avoid 
inappropriate liability for the “tipper” in patient/psychiatrist, attor-
ney/client, whistleblower/journalist, and similar scenarios, the New-
man definition of Rule 10b-5 “personal benefit” would be overly 
narrow.224 
In Dirks v. SEC,225 the Supreme Court explained why the “per-
sonal benefit” requirement is distinct from scienter.226 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                             
 221 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 5.4.4, at 474 (footnote omitted). For 
a somewhat similar example of a commuter on a train discussing confidential in-
formation that can be overheard by an eavesdropping stranger or, alternatively, 
by a day-trader/friend of the commuter whom the commuter knows is within ear-
shot, see SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 222 The mail fraud and securities fraud insider trading case of United States v. 
Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), involved similar facts, but the defend-
ant was the psychiatrist and not the patient. See id. at 270. For additional discus-
sion of Willis, see supra note 137. 
 223 Dirks v. SEC itself held that a whistleblower did not violate Rule 10b-5 by 
disclosing to an analyst material nonpublic information about a massive fraud at 
the whistleblower’s former employer. See 463 U.S. 646, 649–50, 666–67 (1983). 
 224 For the Newman definition, see supra text accompanying note 217. 
 225 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 226 See id. at 663 (“Scienter in some cases is relevant in determining whether 
the tipper has violated his Cady, Roberts duty. But to determine whether the dis-
closure itself ‘deceive[s], manipulate[s], or defraud[s]’ shareholders . . . the initial 
inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This requires 
courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or 
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure . . . .”); id. at 663 n.23 (“The issue in 
this case, however, is not whether Secrist or Dirks acted with scienter, but rather 
whether there was any deceptive or fraudulent conduct at all, i.e., whether 
Secrist’s disclosure constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty and thereby caused 
injury to shareholders.”). For discussion of Dirks’ distinction between scienter 
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in situations like that of the patient/psychiatrist, attorney/client, and 
even the whistleblower/journalist, the distinction between scienter 
and “personal benefit” may be blurry. 
With mail/wire fraud, at least a mild form of the “personal ben-
efit” test may be necessary to prevent unjust “tipper” liability in the 
patient/psychiatrist, client/attorney, whistleblower/journalist, and 
similar situations. 
As noted at the end of Part I, mail/wire fraud is an inchoate crime 
that requires nothing more than devising a scheme and causing a 
requisite use of the mail or wires to begin implementation of the 
scheme.227 Suppose one or more persons devise an insider trading 
scheme and cause the required use of the mail or wires. For 
mail/wire fraud, one question would be whether the scheme must 
contemplate (1) for initial tipper liability that she receive a “personal 
benefit,” however defined, and/or (2) for tippee liability that she 
know or should know of the initial tipper’s violation (and possibly 
the initial tipper’s improper “personal benefit”).228 
Few courts have addressed whether the Rule 10b-5 tipper/tippee 
requirements apply to the mail/wire fraud liability of tippers and tip-
pees. One commentator has noted: “Whether courts would adopt 
such  [a “personal benefit” test for mail/wire fraud tipper liability] 
is an open question. Nothing in Carpenter explicitly requires it.”229 
                                                                                                             
and “personal benefit,” see Pritchard, supra note 217, parts II and III. For addi-
tional discussion of the distinction between scienter and “personal benefit,” see 
SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2012). 
The Rule 10b-5 insider trading case of United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 
446-47 (2d Cir. 2014), separately discussed “personal benefit” and scienter/mens-
rea and defined the latter as follows: “We have defined willfulness in this context 
`as a realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act under 
the securities laws.’” Id. at 447 (quoting United States v. Cassese, 482 F.3d 921, 
98 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 227 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the req-
uisite use of the mail or wires, see supra Part II(A). The use of the mail or wire 
may be by an innocent party or by an associate of the defendant. See supra notes 
26–30 and accompanying text. 
 228 For a discussion of the Dirks tests for Rule 10b-5 tipper and tippee liability, 
see supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the recent 
Second Circuit decision making it harder for the prosecution to satisfy these tests, 
see supra notes 216–28 and accompanying text. 
 229 Dreeben, supra note 83, at 214; cf. Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the 
Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573, 638 n.287 (1987) (the uncertainty 
created by the “personal benefit” requirement for tipper liability “will increase if 
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In Carpenter,230 one of two authors of the Wall Street Journal 
“Heard on the Street” column, R. Foster Winans, gave advance in-
formation about the contents of his column to both his roommate, 
David Carpenter, and to Peter Brant, Kenneth Felis, and David 
Clark.231 Brant, Felis, and Clark traded on the information, and 
Winans, Brant, Felis, and Clark shared the profits.232 
With no discussion of why Carpenter was an aider and abettor, 
the Supreme Court affirmed his mail/wire fraud conviction for aid-
ing and abetting.233 Although the Court frequently described Winans 
and Felis as mail/wire fraud co-conspirators,234 it felt no need to ex-
plain why, probably because Winans and Felis shared profits.235 The 
Court simply stated: “We have little trouble in holding that the con-
spiracy here to trade on the Journal’s confidential information is not 
outside the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes, provided the 
other elements of the offense are satisfied.”236 As to the element of 
intent of those to whom Winans conveyed the information, the Court 
said only: “[T]he District Court’s conclusion that each of the peti-
tioners acted with the required specific intent to defraud is strongly 
supported by the evidence.”237 
Nor did the Second Circuit’s decision in Carpenter explore why 
under mail/wire fraud Carpenter was liable as an aider and abettor 
and Winans and Felis were liable as co-conspirators.238 As to the 
mail/wire fraud required specific intent of Winans and Felis, the cir-
cuit court simply stated: “it is sufficient that the district court found 
                                                                                                             
more insider trading cases are prosecuted under the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes . . . .”). 
In United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), the government did not 
charge the defendants with mail/wire fraud. See id. at 442–43. 
 230 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). For additional discussion 
of Carpenter, see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text, 63–83 and accom-
panying text. 
 231 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22–23. 
 232 See id. at 23. 
 233 See id. at 22, 25–28. 
 234 See id. at 23, 27–28. 
 235 See id. at 23. 
 236 Id. at 28. 
 237 Id. 
 238 See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1034–35 (2d Cir. 
1986), aff’d in part, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (affirming wire fraud and mail fraud con-
victions). 
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that Winans and Felis intended to deceive and defraud the Jour-
nal . . . .”239 
The trial court, however, did briefly discuss why Carpenter was 
liable as an aider and abettor under both the securities and mail/wire 
fraud statutes: 
During his one and a half years at the WSJ, he be-
came aware of the rules of the game and conse-
quently knew that what Winans was doing was a 
fraud on the WSJ. He endorsed the checks made out 
to him by Brant or Felis, allowed Winans to trade in 
his name in the Merrill Lynch and Schwab accounts, 
and to that extent willfully participated in the crimi-
nal venture and helped it succeed.240 
The district court also found that Carpenter was not a co-con-
spirator because the Government had not shown beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that he had ever reached an agreement with the other con-
spirators; nor did Carpenter receive a share of the profits.241 
Finally, the trial court addressed why Winans and Felis were part 
of a conspiracy, which the opinion found began on October 16, 
1983, when Winans and Brant agreed to trade on advance infor-
mation about the columns. Felis agreed to participate soon after-
wards; pursuant to the agreement, the parties traded in advance of 
the columns and split the profits.242 As to intent, the trial court ex-
plained: 
The government must also establish that the defend-
ants acted with specific intent, a discussion equally 
applicable to the mail, wire and securities fraud 
counts [citing the discussion of scienter in Dirks v. 
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983)].  .  .  . 
The essence of the defendants’ argument is that to 
have intended to defraud the Wall Street Journal, 
                                                                                                             
 239 Id. at 1035. 
 240 United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 
791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d in part, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (affirming wire 
fraud and mail fraud convictions). 
 241 See id. at 848–49. 
 242 See id. at 831–38, 848. 
294 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:220 
each defendant would have to know the specifics of 
the conflicts of interest policy . . . . 
We do not agree that the specific intent requirement 
is meant to be quite that specific. Nor do we believe 
that such a precise knowledge of what type of wrong 
Winans was committing at the Journal is necessary 
to show that any defendant aided and abetted the 
fraud. The government is not required to prove actual 
knowledge by each defendant, of every detail that 
made the scheme a fraudulent one . . . . 
Our focus is on whether the defendants intended to 
deceive the Journal, or aided and abetted Winans in 
his efforts to deceive the Journal. The defendants 
need not have known about every particular of the 
conflicts of interest policy to have knowledge that the 
Wall Street Journal was being defrauded by Winans 
for his own financial gain . . . .243 
Because Carpenter involved a conspiracy to share information 
and split profits, none of the opinions had to discuss the tests for 
tipper and tippee liability.244 
As discussed earlier,245 United States v. Ruggiero,246 was a 
“classical relationship” insider trading case that affirmed the Rule 
10b-5 convictions of a tippee using the test: “knew or should have 
known” of the initial insider/tipper’s violation.247 After affirming 
the Rule 10b-5 convictions, the court relied on its Rule 10b-5 dis-
cussion to affirm summarily the wire fraud convictions of the tippee 
with virtually no analysis and with possible implicit adoption of the 
“knew of should have known” test but no express mention of it.248 
In his dissent in United States v. Chestman, Judge Winter com-
mented: 
                                                                                                             
 243 Id. at 847. 
 244 For a discussion of these tests under SEC Rule 10b-5, see supra notes 216–
29 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra notes 167–76 and accompanying text. 
 246 56 F.3d 647 (5th Cir.1995). 
 247 See id. at 653–56. 
 248 See id. at 656. For a quotation from this part of the opinion, see supra text 
accompanying note 175. 
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I am unclear as to whether the [tipper’s] breach of 
duty and the tippee’s knowledge of that breach as re-
quired by Dirks is coextensive with the similar re-
quirements in [the mail/wire fraud decision] in Car-
penter. The Dirks rule is derived from securities law, 
and its limitation to information obtained through a 
breach of fiduciary duty is, as noted, influenced by 
the need to allow persons to profit from generating 
information about firms so that the pricing of securi-
ties is efficient. The Carpenter rule, however, is de-
rived from the law of theft or embezzlement, and a 
tippee’s liability may be governed by rules concern-
ing the possession of stolen property. Logic is there-
fore not a barrier to the growth of disparate rules con-
cerning a tippee’s liability depending on whether 
Section 10(b) or mail fraud is the source of law. 
However, because under any such disparity in rules 
the Section 10(b) charge would be harder to prove 
than a mail fraud charge, I need not explore the issue 
further.249 
Earlier, this Article discussed whether Judge Winter was correct 
that mail/wire fraud liability would be more difficult to prove.250 
When discussing the specific intent to defraud required to con-
vict a remote tippee under Rule 10b-5, Judge Rakoff said the re-
quired intent should be the same for both Rule 10b-5 and mail/wire 
fraud: 
But where, as in this case, the Government charges a 
scheme to defraud under subdivision (a) of Rule 
10b–5, proving specific intent to defraud is neces-
sary. Indeed, were it otherwise, an insider trading de-
fendant charged, in virtually identical words, with vi-
olating both the mail fraud statute and Rule 10b–5, 
                                                                                                             
 249 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 581–82 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(Winter, J., dissenting). For additional discussion of Judge Winter’s dissent, see 
supra notes 119–37 and accompanying text. For discussion of possible special 
Rule 10b-5 insider trading solicitude for analysts, see supra note 129 and accom-
panying text. 
 250 See supra notes 123–37 and accompanying text. 
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could be convicted of the latter but acquitted of the 
former, even though the latter is a specialized sub-
species of the former.251 
In the course of holding that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port a tippee’s conviction for both securities fraud and mail fraud, a 
much earlier district court opinion said of both securities and mail 
fraud: “it is sufficient if the government shows that [the initial mis-
appropriator/tipper] breached a duty and [the remote tippee] knew 
of that breach.”252 
In any event, few opinions have directly addressed the issue of 
whether the Dirks tests for Rule 10b-5 tipper and tippee liability ap-
ply to a mail/wire fraud tipper and tippee. 
6. “WHILE IN POSSESSION OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC 
INFORMATION” VERSUS “ON THE BASIS OF MATERIAL 
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION” 
In United States v. O’Hagan,253 the Eighth Circuit reserved the 
question of whether an insider trading defendant convicted of 
mail/wire fraud must have traded “while in possession of material 
nonpublic information” versus “on the basis of material nonpublic 
information.”254 
                                                                                                             
 251 United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
aff’d, 555 Fed. App’x 98 (2d Cir. 2014). For additional discussion of Whitman, 
see supra note 137. For a discussion of commentary on the derivation of Exchange 
Act Section 10(b) from the mail fraud statute, see id. 
 252 United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., L.P., 785 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 253 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998) (heard on remand from United States v. O’Ha-
gan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)). 
 254 See 139 F.3d at 653. 
The insider trading case of United States v. Ruggiero affirmed the Rule 10b-5 
convictions using the “in possession of” language with no discussion of the issue 
of “possession” versus “on the basis of.” See 56 F.3d 647, 653–56 (5th Cir.1995). 
After affirming the Rule 10b-5 convictions, the court affirmed the wire fraud con-
victions with virtually no discussion and no mention of “possession” or “use.” See 
id. at 656. For additional discussion of Ruggiero, see supra notes 167–76 and 
accompanying text, 253–55 and accompanying text. 
The court in United States v. Cherif, a mail/wire fraud stock market insider trading 
case, used the language “trading on the basis of fraudulently obtained confidential 
information,” but did not address the issue of “possession” versus “on the basis 
of.” See 943 F.2d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 1991). The court also held that the defendant 
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The insider trading portion of United States v. Royer255 dis-
cussed wire fraud and Rule 10b-5 misappropriation convictions 
jointly and affirmed them.256 Without distinguishing between wire 
fraud and Rule 10b-5, the court adopted the “knowing possession of 
the material nonpublic information” as opposed to the “use of the 
information” test.257 
Because of the paucity of cases, the issue remains unresolved. 
When eventually answering this question, the courts may borrow 
from the decisions addressing the same issue under SEC Rule 10b-
5,258 especially prior to the adoption of SEC Rule 10b5-1.259 
CONCLUSION 
After the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Carpenter v. 
United States,260 the federal mail and wire fraud statutes became po-
tent prosecutorial weapons against insider trading when the infor-
mation-owner is the victim. 
SEC Rules 14e-3261 and 10b-5 cover a great deal of stock market 
insider trading and tipping, but certainly not all.262 For many rea-
sons, the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory may not be 
available for insider trading and tipping. One possible example is a 
corporate insider trading in the company’s debt instruments; it is un-
clear whether she has a “classical relationship” with the party on the 
other side of the trade. 
                                                                                                             
had waived his argument that the trial court had “failed to instruct the jury that it 
had to find that confidential business information was a `substantial or motivating 
factor’ for his stock trades.” Id. 
 255 549 F.3d 886, 897–99 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 256 See id. at 897–99. 
 257 See id. at 899 (citing the Rule 10b-5 case of United States v. Teicher, 987 
F.2d 112, 119–21 (2d Cir. 1993)). For discussion of Teicher, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.4.5, at 176–77. 
 258 For a discussion of this issue under SEC Rule 10b-5, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.4.5. 
 259 For a discussion of SEC Rule 10b5-1, see id. § 4.4.5, nn.416–34 and ac-
companying text. 
 260 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 261 For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, 
ch. 9. 
 262 Rule 14e-3 is confined to the tender offer context. See id. § 9.1. For discus-
sion of the application of SEC Rule 10b-5 to insider trading, see id., chs. 4, 5. 
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With stock market insider trading and tipping, an alternative to 
the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory is Rule 10b-5 misap-
propriation. Somewhat similar to Rule 10b-5 misappropriation is 
mail/wire fraud on the confidential information owner. This latter 
breach might be more extensive than, co-extensive with, or less ex-
tensive than Rule 10b-5 misappropriation (although Rule 10b-5 does 
not apply to inside trading of an item not a “security” under the fed-
eral securities laws, e.g., commodities). 
Suppose, however, neither Rule 10b-5 misappropriation nor 
mail/wire fraud on the information-owner is available, perhaps be-
cause the information source/owner gave permission to trade or tip 
or possibly because the defendant disclosed in advance to the infor-
mation source/owner the plan to trade or tip. 
In that situation, another possible victim of mail/wire fraud is the 
party on the other side of the insider trade. Uncertain is whether, for 
stock market insider traders, the necessary mail/wire fraud relation-
ship is broader, narrower, or the same as the requisite Rule 10b-5 
“classical relationship.” Thus far, virtually no courts have consid-
ered the insider trader’s mail/wire fraud duty to disclose to the party 
on the other side of the transaction. Under mail/wire fraud, a stock 
market insider trader might conceivably have a duty to disclose to 
the party on the other side even in the absence of a Rule 10b-5 “clas-
sical relationship.” 
Another issue unexamined by the courts is whether an employee 
engaging in an insider trade of her company’s stock could be crimi-
nally liable under two different mail/wire fraud theories with two 
separate mail/wire fraud victims: the information owner and the 
party on the other side of the trade. 
With stock market insider trading for mail/wire fraud, the mate-
riality standard may be: (1) laxer—less stringent than the “reasona-
ble person” test—or in cases involving deprivation of informational 
property, (2) different, dealing with the importance to the owner of 
the information as opposed to a stock market investor. Conse-
quently, the government may be able to use mail/wire fraud when 
SEC Rule 10b-5 does not apply. 
Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical relationship” theory and proba-
bly the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, the initial tipper must 
receive a “personal benefit.” Under the Rule 10b-5 “classical rela-
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tionship” theory and probably the Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doc-
trine, each direct and remote tippee must “know or should know” of 
the initial tipper’s violation. 
It is unclear whether these requirements apply to the mail/wire 
fraud liability of tippers and tippees. Again, were the standards laxer 
for mail/wire fraud, the government would be able to use mail/wire 
fraud when Rule 10b-5 does not apply. For example, where courts, 
like the Second Circuit, make it harder to meet the Rule 10b-5 tests 
for tipper and tippee liability, 263 prosecutors may turn to the 
mail/fraud statutes for convictions. 
With stock market insider trading, several Supreme Court Jus-
tices264 and Judge Ralph K. Winter265 have said that mail/wire fraud 
is broader than Exchange Act Section 10(b)/SEC Rule 10b-5.266 In 
the insider trading case O’Hagan, the Supreme Court said: “Just as 
in Carpenter, so here, the ‘mail fraud charges are independent of 
[the] securities fraud charges, even [though] both rest on the same 
set of facts.’”267 
In short, for stock market insider trading, some elements of lia-
bility may be different and possibly easier to satisfy under mail/wire 
fraud than under SEC Rule 10b-5. The courts have largely failed to 
explore these differences. 
                                                                                                             
 263 See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446–55 (2d Cir. 2014). For a 
discussion of Newman, see supra notes 216–28 and accompanying text. In New-
man, the government did not charge the defendants with mail/wire fraud. See 773 
F.3d at 442–43. 
 264 See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 265 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 581–82 (2d Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (Winter, J., dissenting). For additional discussion of this portion of Judge 
Winter’s dissent, see supra notes 119–23, 256 and accompanying text. 
 266 In the words of one commentator: “if fraud under the securities laws cannot 
be established, the securities fraud claims fail, but the mail and wire fraud claims 
may still stand. . . .Notwithstanding the overlap that occurs in cases, what might 
be fraud in a mail fraud . . . context is not necessarily fraud in a securities law 
context.” Joanna B. Apolinsky, The Boundaries of Fraud Under the Insider Trad-
ing Rules, 13 FLA ST. U. BUS. REV. 1, 26–28 (2014) (footnotes omitted). 
 267 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678 (1997) (bracketed material in 
original) (quoting Brief for United States 46–47). 
